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ARTICLE
THE AOC IN THE AGE OF COVID—
PANDEMIC PREPAREDNESS PLANNING
IN THE FEDERAL COURTS
ZOE NIESEL*
Abstract. The 2020 COVID-19 pandemic created a crisis for American
society—and the federal courts were not exempt. Court facilities came to a
grinding halt, cases were postponed, and judiciary employees adopted workfrom-home practices. Having court operations impacted by a pandemic was
not a new phenomenon, but the size, scope, and technological lift of the
COVID-19 pandemic was certainly unique.
Against this background, this Article examines the history and future of
pandemic preparedness planning in the federal court system and seeks to
capture some of the lessons learned from initial federal court transitions to
pandemic operations in 2020. The Article begins by examining pandemic
planning efforts by the federal courts starting in the early 1900s and traces
pandemic response measures in the courts regarding the Spanish flu and H1N1.
These historical pandemics show the importance of consistent action in the
federal courts regarding pandemic planning and emergency operations. The
types of pandemic plans in place before COVID-19 also illustrate a largely
untested system.
The Article then examines the measures taken during COVD-19 to keep
courthouse doors open, including the approach by the Administrative Office
of the Courts (AOC) and an analysis of district court and circuit court
approaches. The data shows disparate early responses, with many federal courts
later coalescing around the use of remote hearings for at least some types of
*

Professor of Law, St. Mary’s University School of Law.

157

Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2022

1

St. Mary's Law Journal, Vol. 53 [2022], No. 1, Art. 4

158

ST. MARY’S LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 53:157

proceedings. Later guidance from the Administrative Office of the Courts
more effectively created a tiered system that could guide courts using local
considerations. As such, this Article concludes that initial federal court
responses to the COVID-19 pandemic could be improved during future
emergencies by identifying appropriate underlying data sets, using consistent
technological approaches, and creating consistency in geographic regions.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The spring of 2020 proved to be one of the most disruptive and shocking
in modern history.1 The spread of the COVID-19 virus and its deadly
unfurling into a global pandemic changed countless aspects of American life
and did not spare the federal court system.2 With over a year passing since
the early spread of COVID-19 in spring 2020, it seems appropriate to
examine what the early response of the federal court system means for the
future of litigation.

1. See generally Lora Jones et al., Coronavirus: How the Pandemic Has Changed the World Economy, BBC
NEWS (Jan. 24, 2021), https://www.bbc.com/news/business-51706225 [https://perma.cc/8JURYL9M] (evaluating the virus’ effect on job seekers, unemployment, and the world economy).
2. See, e.g., Jessica Gresko, Chief Justice Praises Work of Federal Courts During COVID-19, AP NEWS
(Dec. 31, 2020), https://apnews.com/article/technology-coronavirus-pandemic-us-supreme-courtjohn-roberts-courts-a726125db5749a5a9402dc80c404ad82
[https://perma.cc/EER4-GN2J]
(“By April, judges around the country were guiding critical court functions from their home offices—
or their kitchen tables . . . . Hearings of all sorts went virtual. Judges quickly (or at least eventually)
learned to use a wide range of available audio and video conferencing tools.” (quoting
Chief Justice Roberts)).
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The United States Center for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC)
defines a pandemic as a disease “epidemic that has spread over several
countries or continents . . . .”3 By March 2020, COVID-19 was easily
classified as a pandemic, stretching across the world and inflicting alarming
numbers of deaths and general disruption.4 The move to social distancing,
remote work, and quarantine to contain the spread of the pandemic
uprooted American life.5 Businesses and schools closed, states required
those in public to wear masks and remain six feet apart, and “Zooming”
became a verb referring to the widespread use of web conferencing for
remote work.6
As the fabric of American society strained under the realization that
modern society, medical practices, and technology cannot insulate us from
an ancient biological enemy, the realization that COVID-19 will impact the
justice system for years to come seems clear.7 Actors within our judicial
system, including judges, attorneys, civil liberties advocates, and scholars,
have realized the federal court system cannot continue with business as
usual in light of the pandemic and sweeping responses, including using new
technology to conduct litigation.8 Indeed, the spring of 2020 saw significant
3. Principles of Epidemiology in Public Health Practice, Third Edition an Introduction to Applied
Epidemiology and Biostatics, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/
csels/dsepd/ss1978/lesson1/section11.html [https://perma.cc/MR94-4URZ].
4. WHO Director-General’s Opening Remarks at the Media Briefing on COVID-19 - 11 March 2020,
WORLD HEALTH ORG. (Mar. 11, 2020), https://www.who.int/director-general/speeches/
detail/who-director-general-s-opening-remarks-at-the-media-briefing-on-covid-19—-11-march-2020
[https://perma.cc/ZTN9-2AZ5]; see Yen-Chin Liu et al., COVID-19: The First Documented Coronavirus
Pandemic in History, 43 BIOMEDICAL J. 328, 331 (2020) (“[T]he COVID-19 pandemic has spread
globally and consequently resulted in at least 772,296 deaths worldwide as of August 18, 2020.”).
5. Ari Levy, Working from Home Is Here to Stay, Even When the Economy Reopens, CNBC
(May 11, 2020, 1:01 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2020/05/11/work-from-home-is-here-to-stayafter-coronavirus.html [https://perma.cc/E984-NN8K]; see, e.g., Court Coronavirus Information, TEX.
JUD. BRANCH, https://www.txcourts.gov/court-coronavirus-information/electronic-hearings-zoom/
[https://perma.cc/9AEL-66PN] (illustrating the novel introduction of electronic hearings to facilitate
court access to the general public).
6. See Levy, supra note 5 (“[I]ndustries that can successfully function over internet lines are
choosing to keep their people home. Long commutes have been replaced with heavy Zoom use . . .
[and] kids are likely to be at home . . . .”).
7. See, e.g., Pandemic Disrupts Justice System, Courts, AM. BAR ASS’N (Mar. 16, 2020),
https://www.americanbar.org/news/abanews/aba-news-archives/2020/03/coronavirus-affecting-ju
stice-system/ [https://perma.cc/JWN8-FUCR] (“Measures taken to address the dangers of the
coronavirus are expected to exacerbate the significant backlog of cases in state and federal courts, not
to mention immigration courts that have a backlog of more than 1 million cases.”).
8. See Jennifer Lapinski et al., Zoom Jury Trials: The Idea Vastly Exceeds the Technology, LAW
(Sept. 29, 2020, 4:13 PM), https://www.law.com/texaslawyer/2020/09/29/zoom-jury-trials-the-idea-
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disruptions to orderly proceedings, including the discontinuation of jury
trials, delay in cases, problems with telework for judges and court staff,9 and
illness.10
Beginning in March 2020, dozens of federal courts closed and delayed
proceedings, including the United States Supreme Court suspending
arguments for March and April.11 The Court also issued an accompanying
order extending deadlines, including the deadline to file any petition for a
writ of certiorari to 150 days from the lower court judgment, and noted that
motions for extension of time would be granted as a matter of course if
related to difficulties surrounding the COVID-19 outbreak.12 These steps
were nearly unprecedented—the Court had often remained open when the
rest of Washington closed, including holding oral arguments during
Hurricane Sandy in 2012.13 For lower federal courts that remained open,
many were limiting hearings to fewer than ten people, allowing staff to work
from home, and utilizing videoconferencing to the extent possible.14
It seems clear that a “new normal” is firmly on the horizon. While the
move to remote hearings, depositions, and, in some cases, e-service, has
been disruptive, there is now the opportunity for capitalization on this

vastly-exceeds-the-technology/ [https://perma.cc/6F58-A8XG] (addressing the pitfalls and
difficulties of using technology to conduct hearings).
9. In the midst of Spring 2020, Texas Supreme Court Justice Nathan Hecht noted the need of
the court system to adopt additional best practices in technology, stating, “We’re going to have to
completely rethink how much has to be done in person, how much can be done using technology—
that whole issue that we’ve just never paid much attention to . . . . We’re just going to have to rethink
doing justice in the 21st century in confronting these difficulties . . . .” Alexander Mallin et al.,
How Coronavirus Is Crippling Courts and Raising Concerns Among Civil Liberties Advocates, ABC NEWS
(Mar. 24, 2020, 3:06 AM) (internal quotation marks omitted), https://abcnews.go.com/US/corona
virus-crippling-courts-raising-concerns-civil-liberties-advocates/story?id=69757862 [https://perma.
cc/JC8Y-729G].
10. For example, in March 2020 near the start of the pandemic, the Middle District of
Pennsylvania, the Northern District of Georgia, and the District of Delaware were all closed over
concerns that someone within the court had contracted COVID-19. Id.
11. Press Release, Sup. Ct. of the U.S. (Mar. 16, 2020), https://www.supremecourt.gov/
publicinfo/press/pressreleases/pr_03-16-20 [https://perma.cc/C4Q2-JJ5Y].
12. Order List, 589 U.S. (2020), https://www.supremecourt.gov/orders/courtorders/
031920zr_d1o3.pdf [https://perma.cc/R7PR-VCJK].
13. Debra Cassens Weiss, As Hurricane Sandy Closes Many East Coast Courts, Supreme Court Stays
Open on Monday, A.B.A J. (Oct. 29, 2012, 11:38 AM), https://www.abajournal.com/news/article/as_
hurricane_sandy_closes_many_east_coast_courts_supreme_court_plans_to_sta [https://perma.cc/
BCW8-GPHU].
14. Mallin et al., supra note 9.
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potential long-term.15 Indeed, remote appearances can be cheaper, faster,
and more efficient, decreasing the cost of litigation and moving business
through the courts at a faster rate.16 There is certainly a place for these
practices going forward, and the COVID-19 pandemic may have accelerated
the legal profession’s use of remote technology.17 Indeed, scholars and
advocates have long been articulating that the profession should embrace
new ways of doing business to decrease the cost and travel burden of
litigation.18
However, before some of these new changes can firmly take hold, the
first place to look must be backwards—at what happened in the initial
months of the pandemic regarding keeping justice moving.19 In examining
the responses of the federal district courts and circuit courts, a clear split
emerges—courts that immediately adopted new techniques to keep justice
flowing, and courts that either delayed or left the decision on remote
appearance up to the individual judges or parties.20 This disparate approach
created discrepancies in how the pandemic impacted cases in different parts

15. Randy Kessler, Zoom Court, The Future Is Now., LINKEDIN (May 25, 2020),
https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/zoom-court-future-now-randy-kessler [https://perma.cc/CAB5NGH4] (expanding on the unexpected benefits technology provided courts and discussing why it is
here to stay); see, e.g., Judges Discuss Pros and Cons of Virtual Litigation, TENN. STATE CT.’S (Jan. 19, 2021),
http://www.tsc.state.tn.us/news/2021/01/19/judges-discuss-pros-and-cons-virtual-litigation [https:
//perma.cc/8RQU-RTMM] (“[T]he ease of appearing remotely has resulted in fewer scheduling
conflicts with people who have court business. . . . One unforeseen advantage of the Zoom format
for Judge Hurd has to do with witnesses. When she is on the bench, she is used to observing witnesses
from the side as they sit at the witness stand. Zoom has allowed her to see witnesses face to face,
giving her a better perspective of their demeanor.”).
16. Kessler, supra note 15; Judges Discuss Pros and Cons of Virtual Litigation, supra note 15.
17. See Kessler, supra note 15 (“The use of video and other technology will play an incredible
role in the evolution of our system of justice.”).
18. Id.; see, e.g., Herbert B. Dixon Jr., Technology and the Courts: A Futurist View, 52 JUDGES J. 36,
36 (2013) (highlighting predictions of the possible advantages and disadvantages of technology in
courts).
19. See Janna Adelstein & Douglas Keith, Initial Court Responses to Covid-19 Leave a Patchwork of
Policies, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (Apr. 14, 2020), https://www.brennancenter.org/ourwork/analysis-opinion/initial-court-responses-covid-19-leave-patchwork-policies [https://perma.cc/
EXT5-KFFL] (noting a vast majority of courts in April 2020 had taken steps to respond to the
pandemic while a few district courts continued holding in-person proceedings); see also, In re Order for
Court Operations During Pandemic (Utah Mar. 13, 2020), https://www.guardianship.org/wpcontent/uploads/2020/04/Utah-Order.pdf [https://perma.cc/2QPY-5WKM] (showing the Utah
Supreme Court’s response to the varying orders being issued by courts throughout the state).
20. Adelstein & Keith, supra note 19 (“All of the appeals courts, meanwhile, have either
postponed oral arguments or are holding arguments by phone or video conference. Several of them
have given assigned judges the discretion to continue to hold hearings in person.”).
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of the country, despite all cases being in the same federal system.21 The
reason for this divide relates to the ability of each court to set its own
individual response plan.22 As such, while bodies like the Administrative
Office of the Courts (AOC) have generally given guidance or rough outlines
on emergency responsiveness planning, individual emergency planning is
conducted by each individual district or circuit.23 As a result of this
individual discretion, responses can vary widely, even within a federal
circuit’s geographic borders.24
With the above as background, this Article seeks to examine the initial
court and litigant response to COVID-19. The long and cyclical history of
American pandemics, which have always impacted justice proceedings,
informs part of this response.25 Part I thus examines the history of
pandemic responsiveness in the justice system, looking particularly at the
Spanish flu of 1918 and the H1N1 pandemic.26 The Spanish flu case study
shows the response of an earlier and less sophisticated justice system.27 In
contrast, the H1N1 pandemic shows a more developed and prepared court
system response, one which had already engaged in analyzing what a
pandemic would do to court operations.28 Part II then builds on these
lessons by examining preparedness plans that developed post-H1N1, and

21. See generally Tania Sourdin et al., Court Innovations and Access to Justice in Times of Crisis,
9 HEALTH POL’Y & TECH. 447, 447–50 (2020), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC74
56584/pdf/main.pdf [https://perma.cc/9Y9H-EB4R] (reporting on the world-wide problems the
justice system experienced during the pandemic, including the inability of some U.S. courts to respond
and “shift to online modes of delivery”).
22. See Stephanie Wylie, The Supreme Court’s Failed Response to the Coronavirus Pandemic, CTR. FOR
AM. PROGRESS (Aug. 7, 2020, 9:00 AM), https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/democracy/
news/2020/08/07/488938/supreme-courts-failed-response-coronavirus-pandemic/ [https://perma.
cc/R39W-X9QR] (“In 2012, there were several emergency preparedness summits for the federal
courts, yet none seemed to have focused on pandemic-specific emergency preparedness. As a result,
the judiciary’s response to the coronavirus was largely reactionary.”).
23. Id.
24. See, e.g., COVID and the Courts: Reopening Plans, CROWELL MORING (June 10, 2020),
https://www.crowell.com/NewsEvents/AlertsNewsletters/all/COVID-and-the-Courts-ReopeningPlans [https://perma.cc/MDN7-7KVG] (“Predictably, federal courts’ responses to the ongoing novel
coronavirus pandemic vary across the country.”).
25. See generally Mark Walsh, Outbreaks of Disease Have Shuttered the Supreme Court Going Back More
Than 2 Centuries, A.B.A. J. (Mar. 19, 2020, 9:10 AM), https://www.abajournal.com/web/article/
outbreaks-have-shuttered-the-supreme-court-going-back-more-than-two-centuries [https://perma.
cc/8G92-V7VK] (examining the U.S. Supreme Court’s historical responses to pandemics).
26. See infra Part I.
27. See infra Part I.
28. See infra Part I.
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were thus fully or partially in place at the time of COVID-19.29 Part III
then examines the federal courts’ actual response to COVID-19 in March
and April 2020, tracking the first months and initial orders that set out how
justice would operate.30 The accompanying charts easily highlight the
disparities in approaches.31 Finally, Part IV examines the framework that
should guide the new normal.32 In particular, this Article suggests greater
national pandemic response planning that provides a template for action in
the early stages of a pandemic to limit geographic disparities and
confusion.33 While the COVID-19 pandemic will end, the business of the
courts will not—and history reveals another pandemic is always on the
horizon.34 Lessons learned from this time should provide guidance not just
for pandemic preparedness but also for embracing cost and time-saving
litigation measures in general.
II. PREVIOUS PANDEMIC RESPONSIVENESS AND THE COURTS
It is no question that global pandemics feel like wholly unique events for
those living through them. As individuals watch themselves and their
families succumb to illness, or the fear and uncertainty, it can feel like such
a situation is an inimitable and singularly terrifying moment in time.35
However, pandemics are as old as the version of human society that is
centered around agriculture and the domestication of animals.36 Skeletons
recovered from humans living in pre-agricultural hunter-gatherer societies
show very few markers of infectious disease,37 while skeletons from the
29. See infra Part II.
30. See infra Part III.
31. See infra Chart 1–2.
32. See infra Part V.
33. See infra Part V.
34. Walsh, supra note 25 (recognizing pandemics are a reoccurring event).
35. See, e.g., Carmen Reinicke, For Families with Multiple Generations Under One Roof, the Pandemic
Has Brought Unique Challenges, CNBC (Nov. 27, 2020, 9:30 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2020/11/27/
covid-19-brought-unique-challenges-for-multigenerational-families.html [https://perma.cc/3SWC9DCH] (describing the life-altering changes and challenges for families cohabiting with extended family
members, especially those who are high-risk individuals).
36. See Pandemics That Changed History, HIST. (Jan. 30,2020), https://www.history.com/topics/
middle-ages/pandemics-timeline [https://perma.cc/755S-PAAF?type=image] (noting the earliest
recording of pandemics can be traced back to as early as 430 B.C.).
37. Indeed, this may be one reason author, Jared Diamond, labelled the invention of agriculture
as humanity’s great mistake “from which we have never recovered.” Jared Diamond, The Worst Mistake
in the History of the Human Race, DISCOVER MAG. (May 1, 1999, 12:00 AM), https://www.discover
magazine.com/planet-earth/the-worst-mistake-in-the-history-of-the-human-race [https://perma.cc/
GL5Z-QNSB].
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time period after agriculture was adopted show significant indicators of
diseases passed to humanity through our close contact with populations of
domesticated animals.38 The reason for these startling findings is that many
communicable diseases have roots in human contact with domesticated
animals, or they rely on humans living in close quarters for transmission.39
For the diseases and their underlying microbial or viral agents, dense
human societies and accompanying human trade are great boons.40 Indeed,
global trade has historically enabled diseases to achieve global spread.41 The
famous Bubonic Plague was the product of the so-called “Silk Road,” which
allowed the disease to journey with trade goods and spices to wreak havoc
on Europe.42 Smallpox and measles decimated human societies in the
Americas thanks to the sailors manning the ships that discovered the “New
World.”43
In more modern times, the interconnected nature of global life has
allowed diseases like Ebola, SARS, and H1N1 (swine flu) to jump out of
local communities and onto the national or international stage.44 And
certainly, none of these modern pandemics were as successful as COVID19, which escaped its time living off of bats to spread to just about every
continent on Earth.45
38. Id. (confirming pandemics were facilitated during the agricultural revolution 10,000 years
ago “when in different parts of the world[,] people began to domesticate plants and animals”).
39. JARED DIAMOND, GUNS, GERMS, AND STEEL: THE FATES OF HUMAN SOCIETIES
206–07 (1997) (identifying human diseases and their animal sources—smallpox from cattle, measles
from cattle, and influenza from pigs and birds).
40. See, e.g., Hannah Kuchler & Andrew Edgecliffe-Johnson, How New York’s Missteps Let
COVID-19 Overwhelm the US, FIN. TIMES (Oct. 21, 2020), https://www.ft.com/content/a52198f60d20-4607-b12a-05110bc48723 [https://perma.cc/JR62-54F3] (“Genetic research has found that
most US Covid-19 infections have been of the European strain that landed in New York, not the
Chinese strain of the first west coast cases. . . . Instead, the city circulated it like ‘Grand Central
station.’”).
41. Pandemics That Changed History, supra note 36.
42. Patrick J. Kiger, How the Black Death Spread Along the Silk Road, HIST. (Apr. 23, 2020),
https://www.history.com/news/silk-road-black-death [https://perma.cc/AB66-UNAP].
43. Michael S. Rosenwald, Columbus Brought Measles to the New World. It Was a Disaster for Native
Americans, WASH. POST (May 5, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/history/2019/05/05/
columbus-brought-measles-new-world-it-was-disaster-native-americans/ [https://perma.cc/47KU77F8].
44. See generally Julia Ries, Here’s How COVID-19 Compares to Past Outbreaks, HEALTHLINE
(Mar. 12, 2020), https://www.healthline.com/health-news/how-deadly-is-the-coronavirus-comparedto-past-outbreaks [https://perma.cc/6QWV-6E5M] (reviewing statistics on the SARS, H1N1, and
Ebola outbreaks on a national level).
45. See A. Wilder-Smith, COVID-19 in Comparison with Other Emerging Viral Diseases: Risk of
Geographic Spread via Travel, 7 TROPICAL DISEASES, TRAVEL MED. & VACCINES 1, 2–4 (2021),
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Pandemics offer an unsettling insight into the wheels of justice. Justice,
at its heart, depends on access to the judicial branch—“[a]t the most
fundamental level, court access is a reality only when the courthouse doors
are open and the courts are operational. If a court has to be shut down in
response to a disaster of any sort—whether nature-inflicted or humangenerated—then court access, and thus justice, is denied.”46 Previous
pandemics, both historical and more modern, give some peek into the
business of justice during these crises.47 As such, this section examines two
previous pandemics and the judiciary’s response. This discussion should
contextualize the judiciary’s preparedness concerning the 2020 COVID-19
outbreak.
A. The Spanish Flu of 1918
1918 was a difficult and determinative year in America, and one in which
both bullets and germs claimed significant human casualties.48 At the time,
the United States and much of the world were still involved in World War
I, which has the chilling distinction of being the deadliest human war to
date.49 But the bullets and trenches of World War I were quickly replaced
by one of humanity’s oldest enemies—the flu.50 In 1918, a collection of
influenza viruses now dubbed the “Spanish flu”51 reached across borders
https://tdtmvjournal.biomedcentral.com/articles/10.1186/s40794-020-00129-9 [https://perma.cc/
F9YQ-DYJ2] (“The higher asymptomatic rate, further compounded by pre-symptomatic transmission
has made containment much harder for COVID-19 than for SARS” and other previous outbreaks).
46. FLA. CT. EDUC. COUNCIL’S PUBL’NS COMM., PANDEMIC INFLUENZA BENCHGUIDE:
LEGAL ISSUES CONCERNING QUARANTINE AND ISOLATION, at vi (2019), https://www.flcourts.
org/content/download/218114/file/pandemic_benchguide.pdf [https://perma.cc/UHG2-7SKJ].
47. See, e.g., Wylie, supra note 22 (analyzing the Supreme Court’s closures during previous viral
outbreaks, such as the1918 Spanish flu).
48. See Viewpoint: The Deadly Disease that Killed More People than WW1, BBC (Oct. 13, 2014),
https://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-29541235 [https://perma.cc/HP73-JF7S] (“[In] 1918, the
world was already fighting another battle. It was in the grip of Spanish Influenza, which went on to
kill almost three times more people than the 17 million soldiers and civilians killed during WW1.”).
49. CHARLES RIVER EDITORS, THE 1918 SPANISH FLU PANDEMIC: THE HISTORY AND
LEGACY OF THE WORLD’S DEADLIEST INFLUENZA OUTBREAK (2014).
50. See Viewpoint: The Deadly Disease that Killed More People than WW1, supra note 49 (“Within
months Spanish Flu had killed more people than any other illness in recorded history.”).
51. The name the “Spanish flu” is misleading—the disease, or collection of diseases, did not
originate in Spain. Rather, the name’s origin is in how shocked the populace was to see the way the
disease attacked people from all walks of life—young and old, rich and poor. It was shocking to see
Spain’s king suffering from the disease, and with early news reports coming out of Madrid about an
outbreak, the name “Spanish flu” was born. CHARLES RIVER EDITORS, supra note 50. Indeed, a
contemporaneous report prepared by then-Surgeon General Rupert Blue indicated that the identical
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to kill “as much as 5% of the world’s population.”52 Dubbed the “mother
of all pandemics,”53 the presence of the Spanish flu in the United States was
first recorded in March 1918 when a mess cook at a U.S. Army training
camp in Kansas reported flu-like symptoms.54 By the afternoon on the
same day, 107 soldiers were sick, and “[f]ive weeks later, more than 1,000
[were] infected and 47 were dead.”55 This new strain, which was much
more deadly than previous iterations of the virus, confounded doctors.56
The virus we call the Spanish flu was an H1N1 virus, meaning it
originated in bird populations before making the jump to humans.57 This
jump of an infectious microbe from animals to humans is called
“zoonosis.”58 The version of H1N1 known as the Spanish flu was a
damaging disease, most lethal for young children and those in the prime of
life (ages 15–40), although adults over 65 were also exceptionally affected.59
The reasons for the virus’s deadly nature were largely shrouded in mystery,
with even modern, twenty-first-century scientists relatively stumped by its
origins and makeup.60 In June 2000, a paper entitled Characterization of the
disease was called the “Chinese influenza” when it spread from China to Russia in the late 1800s, the
“Russian influenza” when it later spread from Russia to Europe, “European influenza” when it crossed
from Europe to the United States, and finally the “American influenza” when it later appeared in Japan.
Id.
52. Id.
53. If the Spanish flu was the mother of all pandemics, then modern life is surely the father.
Christopher Klein, Why October 1918 Was America’s Deadliest Month Ever, HIST. (Oct. 5, 2018),
https://www.history.com/news/spanish-flu-deaths-october-1918 [https://perma.cc/9SR2-FYF9].
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. History of 1918 Flu Pandemic, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION,
https://www.cdc.gov/flu/pandemic-resources/1918-commemoration/1918-pandemic-history.htm
[https://perma.cc/82C3-BF7A].
58. See Zoonoses, WORLD HEALTH ORG. (July 29, 2020), https://www.who.int/newsroom/fact-sheets/detail/zoonoses [https://perma.cc/8FVN-BWD9] (“[Z]oonosis is any disease or
infection that is naturally transmissible from vertebrate animals to humans.”); see also Zoonotic Diseases,
CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/onehealth/basics/zoonoticdiseases.html [https://perma.cc/UM8N-UD27?type=image] (“[A]nimals can sometimes carry harmful
germs that can spread to people and cause illness—these are known as zoonotic diseases or zoonoses.
Zoonotic diseases are caused by harmful germs like viruses, bacteria[], parasites, and fungi. These
germs can cause many different types of illnesses in people and animals, ranging from mild to serious
illness and even death.”).
59. History of 1918 Flu Pandemic, supra note 58.
60. See, e.g., Klein, supra note 54 (“The [1918] outbreak confounded . . . fellow
doctors. . . . Some saw an enemy hand at work. Rumors spread that the Kaiser’s U-boats had released
poison clouds in American ports and that German pharmaceutical company Bayer had tainted its
aspirin tablets.”).
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1918 ‘Spanish’ Influenza Virus Neuraminidase Gene described the DNA
sequence of the virus’s neuraminidase gene that codes for a protein required
for the virus to infect cells.61 In their analysis, the researchers noted the
virus’s origins were avian in nature but could not determine a “unique”
feature explaining why the virus was so severe or deadly.62 Additional
research of the total genome of the virus found that no single trait or gene
was responsible for the strain’s enhanced virulence; rather, it was a
combination of eight genes together, and that the strain showed exceptional
virulence over other influenza viruses impacting humans.63
It is worth noting, in addition to its natural properties, the Spanish flu was
entirely helped by the world in which it existed (which is the case, as well,
for the remaining case studies discussed below).64 For example,
World War I likely exacerbated the worldwide nature of the pandemic,
which involved the huge movement of military personnel, close contact in
military bases and camps, and the deployment of approximately 30% of U.S.
Further, there was very limited
physicians to military service.65
understanding of the disease’s origins, with most health experts attributing
the flu to a bacterium, not a virus.66
Initially a springtime disease, the Spanish flu receded in the summer of
1918, only to reemerge with a vengeance in the fall.67 In October 1918,
American life came to a standstill in the deadliest month of the pandemic,
which would also be the deadliest month in American history.68 With no
federal Center for Disease Control and Prevention in existence at the time,
individual municipalities were largely in charge of the response.69
Containment measures included:

61. Ann H. Reid et al., Characterization of the 1918 “Spanish” Influenza Virus Neuraminidase Gene,
97 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCIS. U.S. AM. 6785, 6785 (2000).
62. Id. at 6789.
63. Douglas Jordan et al., The Deadliest Flu: The Complete Story of the Discovery and Reconstruction of
the 1918 Pandemic Virus, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/flu/
pandemic-resources/reconstruction-1918-virus.html [https://perma.cc/W6VK-AKZH].
64. See id. (“Besides the properties of the virus itself, many additional factors contributed to the
virulence of the 1918 pandemic.”).
65. Id.
66. Id. (“No diagnostic tests existed at the time that could test for influenza infection.”).
67. See Pandemics That Changed History, supra note 36 (“Wire service reports of a flu outbreak in
Madrid in the spring of 1918 led to the pandemic being called the ‘Spanish flu.’”).
68. Klein, supra note 54.
69. Id.
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•

In San Francisco, fining or jailing citizens that did not wear a mask in
public.70

•

In New York City, staggering opening and closing of businesses and
factories to minimize the number of people on public transit during
rush hours.71 Additional measures included criminalizing spitting in
public, advising citizens to kiss only through a handkerchief, and
quarantining ships that arrived in port.72

•

Excavating mass graves using steam shovels in Philadelphia, which
suffered a catastrophic outbreak after the city’s Public Health
Director refused to cancel a city parade.73 The decision had
repercussions—deaths and illness were so severe in Philadelphia that
it was “on the verge of a total collapse as a functioning city.”74

By the time the Spanish flu finally abated in 1920, it had killed over 675,000
Americans.75 It was deadlier than the contemporaneous World War I (and
all previous military engagements in history), and the underlying virus
infected in total “a third of the planet’s population.”76
The judiciary’s response to the Spanish flu was mixed.77 At the highest
level of the court system, the Supreme Court of the United States, the
response was swift.78 Due to the risk of illness, the Court postponed
arguments scheduled for October 1918.79 Although surprising, there was
precedent.80 The Court had shortened its calendar in August 1793 and
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. KENNETH C. DAVIS, MORE DEADLY THAN WAR: THE HIDDEN HISTORY OF THE
SPANISH FLU AND THE FIRST WORLD WAR 77–78 (2018).
73. Klein, supra note 54.
74. Id.
75. Id. (“Yet for all the lives lost and changed forever, the Spanish flu quickly faded from public
consciousness.”).
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. See Walsh, supra note 25 (explaining how “in keeping with public health precautions” the
Supreme Court felt the need to act with urgency).
79. Id.
80. See id. (“When the U.S. Supreme Court announced . . . that its March sitting of oral
arguments would be postponed . . . the statement included some historical references for support—
going back as far as 227 years ago.”); see also Two Centuries of Law Guide Legal Approach to Modern Pandemic,
A.B.A. (Apr. 2020), https://www.americanbar.org/news/abanews/publications/youraba/2020/your
aba-april-2020/law-guides-legal-approach-to-pandemic/ [https://perma.cc/B5LD-EG49] (“Under
the U.S. Constitution’s 10th Amendment and U.S. Supreme Court decisions over nearly 200 years,
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August 1798 due to yellow fever outbreaks.81 Further, the postponement
was probably a practical necessity. The Supreme Court at the time was in
the Old Senate Chamber at the Capitol, and the House and Senate galleries
had both already closed on October 7, and the Court followed suit on
October 8.82
And, in some ways, a single early adjournment seemed light compared to
the massive death toll that the pandemic had on the country. Additionally,
despite the decision to postpone arguments for October 1918, the Court
still managed to hand down 229 opinions during its total term, an increase
from the previous term.83
Justice Holmes captured the decision to shutter the Court in 1918 in his
letters to longtime friend and journalist Sir Edward Pollock.84 Holmes
focused on the morality of the decision not to require lawyers to travel to
Washington, D.C., during the outbreak, noting:
I have been here I have got nothing out of such leisure as my duties left me
except to finish up a few odd jobs and tuck in some loose ends. We have
been adjourned on account of the epidemic as it was not thought right to
require lawyers to come, often across the continent, to a crowded and infected
spot . . . .85

Holmes also commented on how he passed the time, noting, “The
Congressional Library, even, has been shut. I profited by my position I
suppose, in getting them to let me in to go to the print rooms and wallow
in potentialities. I could have a very good looking young lady . . . produce
any portfolio I called for . . . .”86 Luckily for Holmes, the Court reopened
by November 4 to resume business as usual.87

state governments have the primary authority to control the spread of dangerous diseases within their
jurisdictions.”).
81. Walsh, supra note 25.
82. Id.
83. WALTER F. PRATT, JR., THE SUPREME COURT UNDER EDWARD DOUGLAS WHITE,
1910–1921, at 206 (1999).
84. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES JR. & FREDERICK POLLOCK, HOLMES-POLLOCK LETTERS:
THE CORRESPONDENCE OF MR. JUSTICE HOLMES AND SIR FREDERICK POLLOCK, 1874–1932,
at 270 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed., Harvard Univ. Press 2d ed. 1961); Walsh, supra note 25.
85. HOLMES & POLLOCK, supra note 85.
86. Id.
87. See Walsh, supra note 25 (“The court took up arguments on Nov. 4, and appears to have
added some argument days in mid-November to help make up for the postponed October cases . . . .”).
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At more local levels, justice continued, albeit strangely. In San Francisco,
court sessions were still held, but outside in public squares.88 Presumably,
decisions like this one were fueled by government entities like the U.S. Naval
Bureau of Sanitation, which reported that the Spanish flu was easily
contained by “[f]resh air and sunshine,” which would “kill the germ in a few
minutes.”89 But the business of the courts was likely occupied by the focus
on San Francisco’s chief health measure to protect its citizens—requiring
the wearing of masks in public.90 Hundreds of people were arrested for not
following the ordinance instituting the requirement to wear masks in public
and were fined either $5 or confined to jail for thirty days for their
disobedience.91 Indeed, anti-mask protests began in the San Francisco area,
with individual citizens openly flouting their refusal to comply with the
order while the beleaguered justice system struggled to keep up with the
imposition of fines.92
B. The H1N1 Pandemic of 2009
If we fast-forward from the Spanish flu into modern times, jumping
about 90 years, we arrive at another flu pandemic, the H1N1 pandemic of
2009 and 2010.93 Although there is truly no “theme” to pandemics, the
widespread social focus on a possible influenza pandemic appears driven by
the Spanish flu’s troubling death toll and modern concerns about novel
influenza strains.
In November 2005, President George W. Bush released a National
Strategy for Pandemic Influenza, noting that “we must be ready to respond
at the federal, state[,] and local levels in the event that a pandemic reaches
our shores.”94 For the judiciary at the federal, state, and local levels,
88. Klein, supra note 54.
89. BUREAU OF MED. & SURGERY, DEP’T OF THE NAVY, EPIDEMIOLOGICAL AND
STATISTICAL DATA, U.S. NAVY, 1918, at 447 (1920), https://play.google.com/books/reader?id=hBp
FAQAAMAAJ&hl=en&pg=GBS.PA349 [https://perma.cc/PF76-WBEX]; Klein, supra note 54.
90. ALFRED W. CROSBY, AMERICA’S FORGOTTEN PANDEMIC: THE INFLUENZA OF 1918,
at 104–05 (2d ed. 2003).
91. Id. at 105; Klein, supra note 54.
92. See Klein, supra note 54 (“‘Obey the laws, and wear the gauze,’ urged public service
posters.”).
93. See generally 2009 H1N1 Pandemic (H1N1pdm09 Virus), CTRS. FOR DISEASE
CONTROL & PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/flu/pandemic-resources/2009-h1n1-pandemic.
html [https://perma.cc/R9ST-HN8P] (expanding on the 2009 pandemic that primarily affected
children and young adults).
94. President Outlines Pandemic Influenza Preparations and Response, THE WHITE HOUSE
(Nov. 1, 2005), https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2005/11/20051101-
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responsiveness planning is critical to keeping the doors to justice open.95
The frequency of a pandemic is estimated to occur every 35 years,96 and
each individual pandemic poses the risk of a lengthy period of social
distancing, significant illness or death, and economic disruption.97
Following President Bush’s National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza, the
Department of Health and Human Services issued an accurate prediction
regarding the facets of an individual pandemic situation:
The ability of the virus to spread rapidly worldwide; [t]he fact that people may
be asymptomatic while infectious; [s]imultaneous or near-simultaneous
outbreaks in communities across the U.S., thereby limiting the ability of any
jurisdiction to provide support and assistance to other areas; [e]normous
demands on the healthcare system; [d]elays and shortages in the availability of
vaccines and antiviral drugs; and [p]otential disruption of national and
community infrastructures . . . .98

These fears would play out a few years later as a novel influenza strain made
it into the popular consciousness.99
1.html [https://perma.cc/EAS9-F7LB]; see National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza, HOMELAND SEC.
COUNCIL (Nov. 2005), https://www.cdc.gov/flu/pandemic-resources/pdf/pandemic-influenzastrategy-2005.pdf [https://perma.cc/4KDA-R4LK] (recognizing the importance of response to and
containment of pandemics).
95. PANDEMIC INFLUENZA BENCHGUIDE: LEGAL ISSUES CONCERNING QUARANTINE AND
ISOLATION, supra note 46, at vi (advancing the policy goal of keeping courts open to ensure the public
has access to justice).
96. Id. at 1.
97. “We can predict now twelve to eighteen months of stress, of watching loved ones die, of
potentially not going to work, of wondering if you’re going to have food on the table the next day.
Those are all things that are going to mean that we’re going to have to plan unlike any other kind of
crisis that we’ve had in literally the last 80-some years in this country.” Interview by Susan Dentzer
with Michael Osterholm, The NewsHour with Jim Lehrer, in Tallahassee, Fl. (Nov. 1, 2005); Strategy
for Pandemic Influenza: Keeping the Courts Open in a Pandemic, FLA. STATE CTS. 3 (Mar. 29, 2006),
https://www.flcourts.org/content/download/219222/file/panflu_strategy.pdf [https://perma.cc/
WVN3-F4PD].
98. HHS Pandemic Influenza Plan, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. 5 (Nov. 2005),
https://www.cdc.gov/flu/pdf/professionals/hhspandemicinfluenzaplan.pdf
[https://perma.cc/
25Q4-2GWS].
99. See An HHS Retrospective to the 2009 H1N1 Influenza Pandemic to Advance All Hazards
Preparedness, PUB. HEALTH EMERGENCY, at ii (June 15, 2012), https://www.phe.gov/Preparedness/
mcm/h1n1-retrospective/Documents/h1n1-retrospective.pdf
[https://perma.cc/R8EN-YU8S]
(“The 2009 H1N1 influenza pandemic, which was declared by the World Health Organization (WHO)
in June 2009 and officially ended in August 2010, provided an important test of our nation’s
preparedness activities and our ability to respond and adapt to a large-scale, protracted public health
emergency with the potential for enormous health consequences.”).
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Epidemics of seasonal influenza are a yearly occurrence, generally
appearing in the winter months (November-March) and resulting in
thousands of deaths per year in the United States, mostly in people over 65
or with underlying health conditions.100 The primary method of containing
the spread of seasonal influenza is with a yearly vaccine, especially for health
care workers and those whose jobs require significant in-person
interactions.101
In contrast to seasonal influenza, pandemic influenza is another
matter.102 Pandemic influenza occurs when a new strain of the flu virus
enters the human population such that humans have no natural immunity
to the virus.103 This lack of natural immunity results in increased rates of
illness and death.104 As such, “[a]n influenza pandemic can be defined as a
global epidemic of influenza and it occurs when a new influenza virus (i.e.[,]
an influenza virus subtype that is not circulating widely in human beings)
emerges and starts spreading in a similar way to normal influenza[.]”105
These modes of transmission generally include coughing, sneezing, and
personal contact with infected people and surfaces.106
This lack of natural immunity to a novel strain of influenza resulted in the
2009 H1N1 swine flu pandemic.107 H1N1 had a famous grandparent—it

100. THOMAS H. WILSON, OSHA GUIDE FOR HEALTH CARE FACILITIES § 550 (2011),
2006 WL 3437355 (“Epidemics of seasonal influenza virus typically occur during the winter months in
temperate regions and are responsible for approximately 36,000 deaths per year in the United States,
according to CDC.”).
101. Cf. id. at § 551 (“CDC’s Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices (ACIP) regularly
updates its seasonal influenza vaccine recommendations in response to medical advances . . . .”).
102. Id. at § 550.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Information About Pandemic Influenza, WORLD HEALTH ORG. REG’L OFF. FOR EUR.
(2009), http://www.euro.who.int/influenza/20080618_20 [https://perma.cc/VD7N-XW2Z]; see also
WILSON, supra note 101 (describing how pandemics, or global epidemics, may occur). See generally Types
of Influenza Viruses, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/flu/about/
viruses/types.htm [https://perma.cc/9RDL-7W7Q] (“Influenza A viruses are the only influenza
viruses known to cause flu pandemics, i.e., global epidemics of flu disease.”).
106. Information About Pandemic Influenza, supra note 106; Rajiv Dhand & Jie Li, Coughs and Sneezes:
Their Role in Transmission of Respiratory Viral Infections, Including SARS-CoV-2, 202 AM. J. RESPIRATORY
CRITICAL CARE MED. 651, 653, 657 (2020), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/
PMC7462404/pdf/rccm.202004-1263PP.pdf [https://perma.cc/3SSK-HGZ2] (“Virus-laden droplets
(generated by coughing, sneezing, or talking) are propelled from an infected person directly onto the
mucosal surfaces of a host.”).
107. See Influenza Virus (Flu), BAYLOR COLL. OF MED., https://www.bcm.edu/departments/
molecular-virology-and-microbiology/emerging-infections-and-biodefense/specific-agents/influenza
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was composed of certain key genes from the virus that resulted in the 1918
Spanish flu108—and had additional genes from flu viruses that circulate in
pigs, as well as genes from flu viruses that circulate in birds and humans.109
Like the Spanish flu, H1N1 was deadly to the young and those in the prime
of life.110
The H1N1 flu strain initially appeared in Mexico during March 2009,
resulting in additional incidents of infection and death in that country
through the spring.111 Mexican authorities noticed in April 2009 a rise in
pneumonia and influenza deaths, both pointing to a virulent flu strain
working its way through the population.112 At the end of April, there were
seven confirmed cases in the United States, with the first death occurring
on April 27, 2009, in a young boy who left Mexico City to visit Brownsville,
Texas.113
New York City quickly became an epicenter, with large spikes in the
number of people seeking emergency room care compared to the previous
flu season.114 In June, the World Health Organization declared the H1N1
virus a global pandemic, and America braced for a possible significant
outbreak during the fall.115 The Obama Administration released a
“Declaration of National Emergency” regarding the spread of the H1N1

-virus-flu [https://perma.cc/HW78-3ANR] (“When novel viruses like this emerge,
natural immunity is usually limited or nonexistent in humans.”).
108. Jeffery K. Taubenberger & David M. Morens, 1918 Influenza: The Mother of All Pandemics,
12 EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASES 15 (2006), https://wwwnc.cdc.gov/eid/article/12/1/050979_article [https://perma.cc/87PE-U7XS].
109. See 2009 H1N1 Flu (“Swine Flu”) and You, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION
(Feb. 10, 2010, 5:00 PM), http://www.cdc.gov/h1n1flu/qa.htm [https://perma.cc/7M2P-SZ8Y]
(explaining scientists call viruses like this “quadruple reassortant” viruses).
110. See id. (“CDC laboratory studies have shown that no children and very few adults younger
than 60 years old have existing antibody to the 2009 H1N1 flu virus . . . .”); see also Influenza-Like Illness
in the United States and Mexico, WORLD HEALTH ORG. (Apr. 24, 2009), https://www.who.int/csr/
don/2009_04_24/en/ [https://perma.cc/5QJL-Y4B6] (“The majority of these cases have occurred in
otherwise healthy young adults.”).
111. Michelle Kaplan, The 2009 H1N1 Swine Flu Pandemic: Reconciling Goals of Patents and Public
Health Initiatives, 20 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 991, 1015–16 (2010).
112. Christopher Eddy et al., Pandemic Influenza H1N1 2009: Public Health Emergency Response,
15 GEO. PUB. POL’Y REV. 63, 64 (2010).
113. Kaplan, supra note 112, at 1016.
114. Id. at 1017.
115. Id. at 992; Donald G. McNeil, Jr., Obama Warns of Return of Swine Flu in the Fall, N.Y. TIMES
(July 9, 2009), https://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/10/health/10flu.html [https://perma.cc/K5PLFLN9] (“At the flu’s peak in May, Mr. Duncan noted, 726 schools were closed across the United
States.”).
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virus in October 2009.116 Health officials implemented a widespread
campaign promoting hand-washing and covering coughs in an attempt to
slow the spread of a virus already dispersed throughout the country.117
However, the spring and summer months provided ample time for
medical science to do its work.118 A vaccine was developed to reduce the
spread of H1N1 that was released in October 2009.119 Once the H1N1
vaccine became widely available, hospitalization and deaths in the United
States decreased.120 The pandemic was, however, a global disaster.121 By
November 2009, there were 482,300 infected persons, with over 6,000
deaths.122
Ultimately, the spread of H1N1 was less than initially predicted.123
However, the “near miss” was considered to be an early warning for what a
possible pandemic could look like, including “the inability of companies to
116. Press Release, Barack Obama, President of the U.S. of Am., Declaration of a National
Emergency with Respect to the 2009 H1N1 Influenza Pandemic, The White House (Oct. 24, 2009),
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/realitycheck/the-press-office/declaration-a-national-emerge
ncy-with-respect-2009-h1n1-influenza-pandemic-0 [https://perma.cc/V8XP-YWUW].
117. See Wendy E. Parmet, Pandemics, Populism and the Role of Law in the H1N1 Vaccine Campaign,
4 ST. LOUIS U. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 113, 120 (2010) (emphasizing the ineffectiveness of border
closings, quarantines, and distribution of antiviral medications to slow the spread of the virus, forcing
health officials “to rely on widely promulgated appeals for hand-washing and respiratory etiquette” to
stymie the spread).
118. Id. at 121 (“In May 2009, the federal government set aside $1 billion for vaccine
development.”).
119. Kaplan, supra note 112, at 1019, 1026 (detailing how “[t]he FDA granted approval to five
separate pharmaceutical companies—Novartis Vaccines and Diagnostics Ltd., MedImmune LLC, CSL
Ltd., Sanofi Pasteur, Inc., and ID Biomedical Corporation of Quebec—to market their version of the
2009 H1N1 vaccine in the United States” and that “antiviral medications, such as Tamiflu or Relenza,
are also available to both out-patients and to those hospitalized with either confirmed or suspected
cases of swine flu”); Influenza A (H1N1) 2009 Monovalent Vaccines Composition and Lot Release, FOOD &
DRUG ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/vaccines-blood-biologics/lot-release/influenza-h1n1-2009monovalent-vaccines-composition-and-lot-release [https://perma.cc/JY5M-RSVK] (listing the five
manufacturers with H1N1 vaccines approved by the FDA, to be made “using the established
manufacturing processes for their seasonal influenza vaccines”); Omudhome Ogbru, Swine Flu (H1N1
Influenza A Virus) Antiviral Treatment, RXLIST, https://www.rxlist.com/antiviral_treatment_swine_flu_
h1n1_influenza_a/drug-class.htm [https://perma.cc/R95F-7XSF] (recognizing antiviral medications,
such as Tamiflu or Relenza, “prevent, shorten, and reduce the severity of flu”).
120. WILSON, supra note 101, at § 552.
121. Influenza Virus (Flu), supra note 108 (discussing how the H1N1 outbreak infected an
estimated 60 million Americans from April 2009 to April 2010).
122. Eddy et al., supra note 113, at 64.
123. Maria Greco Danaher et al., Emergency Preparedness: What Did We Learn from the H1N1 Scare?,
3 J. HEALTH & LIFE SCI. L. 117, 119 (2010); cf. 2009 H1N1 Pandemic (H1N1pdm09 Virus), supra note 94
(observing that the impact of H1N1 on the global population was less severe than those of previous
pandemics).
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manufacture and deliver their goods, severe limitations on the part of
hospitals and physicians to deal with the number of patients affected, and
perhaps even closure of international borders.”124 Chillingly, such
predictions came true just ten years later during the spread of COVID-19 in
spring 2020.125 In total, about 12,000 Americans died from H1N1, a
concerning number for its disproportionate impact on people under age 45
and pregnant women.126
The justice system and society that confronted the H1N1 pandemic was
much more sophisticated than what existed during the Spanish flu pandemic
in 1918. At the national level, institutions like the Supreme Court remained
open and functioning during the spring, summer, and fall of 2009.127
Indeed, the Court heard scheduled arguments during the period, continuing
business as normal.128
Lower courts, however, took more direct approaches to the pandemic.129
The Supreme Court of Florida was particularly on top of the situation,
124. Maria Greco Danaher et al., supra note 124, at 119–20; see Ian Leslie, Sars, Ebola and Mers
Were Near Misses That Led Us to Believe COVID-19 Would Pass Us by Too, NEWSTATESMAN
(May 27, 2020), https://www.newstatesman.com/international/coronavirus/2020/05/sars-ebolaand-mers-were-near-misses-led-us-believe-covid-19-would [https://perma.cc/EY22-9876] (“To learn
from a near miss, you first have to [recognize] it as one. In the past 20 years, there have been a series
of viral outbreaks: Sars in 2002–03, H5N1 (bird flu) in 2006, H1N1 (swine flu) in 2009, Ebola in 2013,
Mers in 2015. Each briefly threatened to become a pandemic, before subsiding. . . . Learning from
near misses also means accepting that just because a risk can’t be measured does not mean it is not
real.”).
125. Cf. Leslie, supra note 125 (explaining how previous pandemics that subsided left
governments without an appropriate response. In fact, “[w]estern governments acted late on Covid19 in part because, without a visceral intuition of danger, they coolly awaited more information.
It took the steeply rising death tolls of near [neighbors] to jolt them into action”).
126. 2009 H1N1 Pandemic (H1N1pdm09 Virus), supra note 94; Kristen A. Swedish et al.,
First Season of 2009 H1N1 Influenza, 77 MT. SINAI J. MED. 103, 108 (2010).
127. See, e.g., Katie Bart & Kalvis Golde, Supreme Court’s Closure Could Be First Disease-Related
Shuttering in a Century, SCOTUSBLOG (Mar. 12, 2020, 5:27 PM), https://www.scotusblog.com/
2020/03/supreme-courts-closure-could-be-first-disease-related-shuttering-in-a-century/
[https://
perma.cc/FHA6-BJUN] (describing how the Supreme Court’s 2020 closure was “the only time the
current Supreme Court building has closed to the public due to an epidemic” since the 1918 Spanish
flu).
128. See generally Argument Transcripts, SUP. CT. OF THE U.S. (2009), https://www.supremecourt.
gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcript/2008#list
[https://perma.cc/HG7Y-Y8QL]
(listing
available transcripts of oral arguments heard during the H1N1 pandemic).
129. See, e.g., In re Response of the Florida State Courts System to Influenza A(H1N1),
No. AOSC09-20 (Fla. May 8, 2009), https://www.floridasupremecourt.org/content/download/
240699/file/AOSC09-20.pdf [https://perma.cc/QKX7-K4WR] (illustrating the Florida Supreme
Court’s directive to take preventive measures against the H1N1 virus by permitting the purchase of
emergency preparedness supplies).
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having engaged in widespread planning even before the pandemic began.130
Perhaps due to a brief international scare with the H5N1 virus in 2005,131
the Florida Office of the State Courts Administrator published a benchguide
beginning in 2007 for pandemic influenza preparation and a strategy
document in 2006 for keeping the courts open during pandemic
influenza.132
Indeed, Florida seems to have been particularly ahead of the curve with
respect to pandemic planning.133 The 2006 strategy guide134 was drafted
at a moment when pandemic influenza was being widely discussed.135 In
predicting another pandemic event, the strategy document noted it was
preparing for an event that could last one to three years, “come in a series
of [waves] . . . estimated to last from four to eight weeks,” and infect up to
35% of the population (10% of which were predicted to need
hospitalization).136 Based on this model, the strategy guide proposed a plan
for keeping the courts open during a lengthy period characterized by
individual isolation and quarantine, restrictions on travel, and cancellation
of public gatherings, school, and work.137 This model was designed to meet
two important goals:

130. See FLA. CT. EDUC. COUNCIL’S PUBL’NS COMM., supra note 46, at iv–vii (noting the
Florida Court Benchguide to prepare for pandemics was first published in 2007, two years before
H1N1 pandemic began).
131. Sandra Yin, Avian Flu and Influenza Pandemics, PRB (Jan. 1, 2006),
https://www.prb.org/avian-flu-and-influenza-pandemics/
[https://perma.cc/8XXY-UNTJ]
(“The World Health Organization (WHO) began counting human cases of H5N1 in 2003, when three
laboratory-confirmed cases in Vietnam all ended in deaths. By early 2006, WHO had linked 78 deaths
to the virus out of 147 reported cases of H5N1 bird flu in humans.”).
132. FLA. CT. EDUC. COUNCIL’S PUBL’NS COMM., supra note 46, at vi–vii-7; Strategy for Pandemic
Influenza: Keeping the Courts Open in a Pandemic, supra note 98, at 3. Indeed, the 2019 version of the
benchguide identified a number of previous public health scares that necessitated planning—“SARS
in 2002–2003, swine flu (which achieved pandemic proportions) in 2009–2010, the H7N9 strain of
avian flu that began spreading in China in early 2013, the West African Ebola epidemic of 2013–2016,
and the July 2019 WHO declaration of the Ebola outbreak in the Democratic Republic of the
Congo . . . .” FLA. CT. EDUC. COUNCIL’S PUBL’NS COMM., supra note 46, at vi–vii.
133. See generally Strategy for Pandemic Influenza: Keeping the Courts Open in a Pandemic, supra
note 98, at 11–18 (outlining a plan for keeping Florida courts operating during a pandemic).
134. Id.
135. See Summary of the 2006–2007 Influenza Season, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL &
PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/flu/pastseasons/0607season.htm [https://perma.cc/2U7WREGK] (reporting the extensive flu activity occurring between October 1, 2006 and May 19, 2007).
136. Strategy for Pandemic Influenza: Keeping the Courts Open in a Pandemic, supra note 98, at 4–5.
137. Id. at 5.
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1. “We must deal with crises in a way that protects the health and safety
of everyone at the court facilities; and
2. We must keep the courts open to ensure justice for the people.”138
To meet these lofty goals, a list of seven tasks were identified, including
updating Court Technology Continuity and Disaster Recovery plans.139
Pursuant to this task, the strategy guide advised a pandemic might severely
limit face-to-face interactions, and video conference and teleconference
infrastructure should be considered.140 To bring that to fruition, the
strategy guide indicated identifying infrastructure components and training
opportunities should be started immediately.141 The strategy guide went
on to identify a number of other important tasks, including educating court
personnel about pandemic safety and operations, improving
communications, and considering how to manage summoning jurors and
having jurors report for service during a pandemic.142
In 2007, the strategy guide was updated143 with an interesting example
technology plan coming from Florida’s Fifteenth Circuit.144 In order to
provide other Florida courts with a template guide to technology planning,
the 2007 strategy guide outline highlighted the Fifteenth Circuit’s threephase operations plan:
1.

Phase I presumes the continued access to existing Court facilities owned
by the county for limited hearings. Hardware for Video conferencing and
data access can be moved to designated sites with existing
infrastructure . . . .

138. Id. at 8 (internal quotation marks omitted) (highlighting the main goals of pandemic
preparedness for Florida courts).
139. Id. at 14 (identifying the need to support judicial IT infrastructure necessary for performing
judicial functions).
140. Id.
141. Id. at 25–26 (establishing the importance of availability and awareness of media training
prior to a public health emergency).
142. Id. at 15–17.
143. See generally Office of the State Courts Administrator, Best Practices from the Pandemic
Influenza COOP Planning in the Florida State Courts, FLA. STATE CTS. (May 21, 2007),
https://www.flcourts.org/content/download/219225/file/Best-Practices-Pandemic-Planning.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6TEZ-K6ZB] (providing a best practices document for preparing Florida courts to
advance judicial goals during a pandemic).
144. Id. at 1–3 (providing an example for keeping courts operating during a pandemic).
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2.

Phase II integrates a web conference component to allow dynamic
decentralized participation by court officers and parties mixed with
limited county facility use.

3.

Phase III provides a completely decentralized model, a “Virtual
Courtroom” providing a Call-in phone number for parties to be queued
and when the time is appropriate be transferred into the virtual
courtroom . . . .145

Florida’s Sixth Circuit also laid out a technology-based pandemicresponsiveness plan, noting its use of technology-based reductions in faceto-face contact would be necessary to keep the court operational and was
the primary infection control precaution being put into place.146 As such,
Florida’s Sixth Circuit proposed using a teleworking policy for its employees
and videoconferencing for court business to keep employees safe while
continuing court operations.147
The follow-up document to the strategy guide is the benchguide, a highly
detailed document, with its 2019 version totaling over 160 pages.148
Inspired by historical pandemics, including the 1918 Spanish flu, the
Supreme Court of Florida noted an influenza pandemic “could conceivably
disrupt court operations for [eighteen] months or longer,” and the primary
concern for the judiciary would be absenteeism.149 To tackle this problem
and provide guidance to keep court operations flowing during a lengthy
pandemic, the benchguide proposed a strategy relying on remote
audio/video communications systems to keep the caseload of the Florida
courts moving.150 The benchguide noted numerous areas of concern that
could be the subject of emergency rules that would evolve in response to
the situation, including:
1.

Computation of time

2.

The form of pleadings and motions

145. Id. at 2.
146. Id. at 3–4.
147. Id. at 4.
148. See generally FLA. CT. EDUC. COUNCIL’S PUBL’NS COMM., supra note 46 (delineating
strategies to deal with Pandemic Influenza).
149. See id. at vii–3 (estimating up to one third of judges and court staff could be unavailable
during an influenza pandemic).
150. Id. at vii.
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3.

Service and filing of court documents

4.

Continuances

5.

Recording of proceedings

6.

Confrontation rights

7.

Open sessions of court

8.

Form of the court record

9.

Use of communication equipment.151

179

In addition to awaiting emergency orders, the Supreme Court of Florida
laid out a tactical plan to continue operations.152 First, it identified that the
goal in the first 90 days of a given influenza pandemic would be to maintain
mission essential functions in a manner meant to limit face-to-face contact,
placing greater focus on handling emergency matters relating to quarantine
and isolation of individuals or cases initiated by public health authorities.153
Beyond the 90-day mark, the goal would be to have “the capacity to conduct
jury trials” and handle emergency civil matters while continuing with
limitations on face-to-face contact.154
To ensure these strategic timelines could be met, the benchguide
proposed procedures involving isolation and sanitation—including wearing
protective garments, increased hand-washing, and training on sanitary
methods of document handling.155 Additionally, the benchguide suggested
moving to a paperless document system, mandating fax or electronic filing
of documents, and encouraging employees to stay home if they are exposed
to illness or experiencing symptoms.156
Especially in light of COVID-19, the benchguide is particularly
interesting in its section on “Last Lines of Defense.”157 In a truly
devastating pandemic situation, the benchguide suggests more radical
151. Id. at 83.
152. See id. at 84–87 (providing “short-term and long-term tactical objectives” to keep Florida
courts operational during an influenza pandemic).
153. Id. at 84–86 (“This document provides that the ‘short-term tactical objectives are
augmentations of existing [circuit/local] continuity of operations plans (COOP).’”).
154. Id. at 85 (detailing the importance of beginning to limit any face-to-face contact in the early
stages of pandemic preparation).
155. Id. at 88.
156. Id. at 88–89.
157. See id. at 90 (indicating these recommendations are for when other plans for prevention
have failed).
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changes to the handling of judicial functions.158 First, it recommended
reducing court business to essential operations by postponing civil actions
to prioritize public health matters and any petitions for habeas relief from
Second, the document
individuals isolated or in quarantine.159
recommended the courts pursue a judicial “islands” strategy or extreme
isolation of judges and their families to ensure courts could continue
functioning.160 The benchguide was apparently inspired by reports of
personnel at isolated military bases avoiding SARS and previous U.S.
pandemics because of extreme isolation.161 Pursuant to the benchguide,
this concept could be imported to judicial functions by asking judges to stay
in strict isolation.162 Strangely, the guide did not seem to consider the
possibility of using remote technologies to maintain judicial isolation.163
Instead, it referenced the use of airtight courtrooms with internal air
filtration systems and partitions separating the judges from the public.164
The guide hardly mentioned videoconferencing; for example, in noting that
judges and court staff should be extremely cautious if dealing with an
appearance by a person charged with disobeying quarantine, and social
distancing precautions could include handling the appearance by video
conference.165
One of the final “Last Line of Defense” suggestions is rooted in ancient
practice—riding the circuit.166 To the extent that court operations totally
ceased in some areas due to absenteeism, the benchguide proposed
permitting Florida judges to travel to different locations to reopen
incapacitated courts.167 Wisely, the guide noted, “This solution does not
address the prevention of illness but, instead, is a response to an isolated
total incapacitation of a court.”168

158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 91.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. See generally id. (discussing the viability of strict isolation to further judicial functions but
omitting the benefits of remote technologies in furthering this goal).
164. Id.
165. Id. at 52.
166. Id. at 92 (permitting judges from different circuits to travel to other locations within Florida
and carry out essential judicial functions).
167. Id.
168. Id.
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Florida’s final H1N1 preparedness document addressed court staffing, as
both the strategy document and the benchguide expressed deep concerns
about absenteeism and employee safety.169 As such, the Office of the State
Court Administrator published the “Pandemic Staffing Guide” to manage
employee presence during the course of a pandemic.170 The staffing guide
increased predictions about absenteeism to 40%, noting there could also be
the “need for social distancing in order to limit the number of” people
present in the workplace.171 To mitigate these issues and keep justice
moving, the staffing guide proposed the use of flexible scheduling and
teleworking for court employees during pandemic situations.172
Considering the extensive pandemic planning undertaken in Florida, the
2009 H1N1 outbreak caused relatively little disruption in justice in the
On May 8, 2009, Chief Justice Peggy Quince signed an
state.173
Administrative Order in response to the H1N1 public health emergency
In the Order,
declared by the Florida Surgeon General.174
Chief Justice Quince noted the extensive planning already undertaken by
the Florida courts, and ordered:
All chief judges of the district and circuit courts shall continue ongoing
planning and take such precautions as may be necessary in the event of any
influenza outbreak, including an immediate review of their emergency
preparedness plans and personnel policies . . . . All such planning shall be
consistent with the policy of mitigating the impact of Influenza A(H1N1)
while keeping the courts open to the fullest extent consistent with public
safety . . . .175

As part of this Order, mitigating measures were identified to include
(1) social distancing plans to eliminate face-to-face contact, (2) sanitary
procedures for court property, and (3) “developing methods of using
169. See generally Pandemic Staffing Guide Ensuring Staffing and Administering Attendance and Leave
During a Pandemic, FLA. STATE CTS. 3 (Aug. 2009), https://www.flcourts.org/content/
download/219223/file/pandemic-staffing-guide.pdf [https://perma.cc/QJ49-KVA4] (preparing
Florida courts for the possibility of a 40% absentee rate).
170. Id.
171. Id. at 3.
172. Id. at 7.
173. See In re Response of the Florida State Courts System to Influenza A(H1N1), supra
note 130, at 2–3 (ordering Florida courts to comply with mitigating measures and developing methods
to maintain court operations).
174. Id. at 1, 5.
175. Id. at 2.
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technology, electronic documents, electronic communications, and
electronic ways of conducting court business to mitigate the spread of the
virus, consistent with law, including a reduction in the use of paper.”176
The Florida justice system was not the only entity to engage in pandemic
influenza preparedness planning ahead of the H1N1 pandemic.177 The
Bureau of Justice Assistance prepared a Road Map for Courts thinking
about Pandemic Emergency Preparedness Planning.178 The document
noted a number of critical issues, including potential loss of staff, disruption
in the supply of necessary equipment, restriction in access to the courts, and
the need to consolidate cases in order to keep justice moving.179
Interestingly, the document did not take on the question of video
appearance in a significant way.180 The document posited the question as
to whether preliminary hearings should be held through video conferencing,
but it did not answer the question or provide additional guidance.181
Additionally, the report referred to the use of paperless systems, like
electronic filing, but did not discuss the item in detail.182 Generally, it
recommended, “Consideration of technological and other capabilities
needed to continue operations, including possible measures that will need
to be instituted to limit face-to-face interactions and rules that will need to
be drafted to provide for remote proceedings.”183 It was apparently used
to success in Texas to mitigate the impact of the H1N1 pandemic on state
court operations.184

176. Id. at 3.
177. See BUREAU OF JUST. ASSISTANCE, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., GUIDELINES FOR PANDEMIC
EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS PLANNING: A ROAD MAP FOR COURTS 1 (Mar. 2007),
https://www.txcourts.gov/media/1353181/PandemicRoadMapFINAL-031407.pdf [https://perma.
cc/LBT6-7E8K] (indicating the assembly of this task force to ensure that local and state courts have a
guide for pandemic planning).
178. Id.
179. Id. at 10–11, 13.
180. See id. at 14 (limiting video technology discussion to “booking” of inmates and “offsite
magistrate or bail hearings”).
181. Id. at 20.
182. Id. at 14.
183. See id. at 14–15 (summarizing necessary measures to ensure courts effectively carry out
their judicial functions).
184. See Task Force on Judicial Emergency Preparedness, TEX. JUD. BRANCH, https://www.txcourts.
gov/organizations/policy-funding/task-force-on-judicial-emergency-preparedness/jrite-resource-arc
hives/ [https://perma.cc/5H4Q-NQPM] (listing the Bureau of Justice Assistance’s Guidelines among
the Texas Task Force’s resource archives).
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Other states also engaged in pre-H1N1 pandemic preparedness
planning.185 For example, Michigan published the Public Health Law
Bench Book for Michigan Courts in 2007,186 and Indiana published the
Public Health Law Bench Book for Indiana Courts in 2005.187
At the federal level, the Administrative Office of the Courts reported in
2009 its success in assisting the federal courts during emergency
preparedness efforts relating to the H1N1 outbreak.188 This success
involved ensuring federal courts had a pandemic influenza preparedness
annex as “part of their continuity of operations plans” and conducting a
telework test to ensure that the agency could work remotely during a
pandemic in order to provide support to the judiciary.189
III. OTHER PREPAREDNESS PLANS
The H1N1 crisis gave courts a chance to test the waters of serious
preparedness planning.190 Indeed, this type of testing happened under
otherwise tough circumstances—there was a change in presidential
administration during the crisis, and the country was suffering from a severe
economic downturn, making resources at the public and private levels scarce
and uncertain.191 In its 2012 retrospective on the H1N1 crisis, the
Department of Health and Human Services noted:
The 2009 H1N1 influenza pandemic, which was declared by the World Health
Organization (WHO) in June 2009 and officially ended in August 2010,
provided an important test of our nation’s preparedness activities and our

185. Mike Cox et al., Public Health Law Bench Book for Michigan Courts, MICH. OFF. OF THE ATT’Y
GEN. (Oct. 2007), https://www.michigan.gov/documents/ag/Michigan_Public_Health_Bench_
Book_221936_7.pdf [https://perma.cc/QHU5-GUJ5].
186. Id.
187. Amy R. Schofield & Linda L Chezem, Public Health Law Bench Book for Indiana Courts, CTR.
FOR PUB. HEALTH L. P’SHIPS (2005), http://www.nfpcar.org/Legal/bench/IN/INBenchBook.pdf
[https://perma.cc/ZQM3-WCX3].
188. James C. Duff, Annual Report of the Director, ADMIN. OFF. OF THE U.S. CTS. 21–22 (2009),
https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/annualreport2009.pdf [https://perma.cc/987G-842R]
(discussing the agency’s success in educating courts on pandemic response plans).
189. Id. at 22.
190. See generally An HHS Retrospective on the 2009 H1N1 Influenza Pandemic to Advance All Hazards
Preparedness, PUB. HEALTH EMERGENCY, at ii (June 15, 2012), https://www.phe.gov/Preparedness/
mcm/h1n1-retrospective/Documents/h1n1-retrospective.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7PM5-T9C8]
(discussing and analyzing the effectiveness of the United States’ preparedness and response to the 2009
H1N1 influenza pandemic).
191. Id.
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ability to respond and adapt to a large-scale, protracted public health
emergency with the potential for enormous health consequences. For the first
time since 1968, we faced the prospect of a pandemic influenza virus that
could have had an enormous impact on morbidity and mortality, as well as on
our nation’s economy.192

Perhaps it is not surprising the judiciary took notice, and additional
preparedness plans came online in the 2010s.193
In July 2017, the Supreme Court of Virginia published a Pandemic
Influenza Bench Book, a document similar in scope to the Florida
benchguide.194 A critical section included operations in the Virginia courts
during a pandemic influenza and asked local outfits to develop a
prioritization system for court operations, distinguishing between Mission
Critical Functions, which must remain in effect, and Mission Essential
Functions, which can be resumed once the court has the necessary
capacity.195 Additionally, the Bench Book listed the applicable Virginia
laws allowing the use of technology to minimize in-person contact or the
exchange of documents.196 Regarding civil litigation, the Bench Book
identified six existing Virginia statutes allowing remote hearings or the use
of special rules of procedure.197 For example:
•

Va. Code § 16.1-93.1198 and Va. Code § 17.1-513.2.199 Use of
telephonic communication systems or electronic video and audio

192. Id.
193. Indeed, preparedness plans came online at a number of governmental levels. For example,
the Illinois Department of Public Health published a Pandemic Influenza Preparedness and Response
Plan in May 2014 analyzing the phases of a pandemic. There is a proposition of a basic plan providing
a framework for federal, state, local, private sector, and nongovernmental entities to prepare for the
disruption of a pandemic outbreak and discusses the roles and responsibilities of the State government,
nongovernmental and volunteer organizations and the private sector. Pandemic Influenza Preparedness and
Response Plan, ILL. DEPT. OF PUB. HEALTH (May 2014), http://www.idph.state.il.us/pandemic_flu/
Illinois_Pandemic_Flu_Plan.pdf [https://perma.cc/YVC7-XKBE].
194. Virginia’s Pandemic Influenza Bench Book states it was written with “two purposes in
mind: to serve as a reference tool for Virginia’s judges, and as a planning tool for Virginia’s courts . . . .”
This resource is meant to serve as a plan for any pandemic response to help courts stay open during a
pandemic. Pandemic Influenza Bench Book for Virginia’s Court System, S. CT. OF VA., at ix (July 2017),
http://www.courts.state.va.us/programs/pfp/benchbook.pdf [https://perma.cc/C9VU-WV7U].
195. See id. at 7-1 (highlighting the importance of categorizing judicial functions to ensure courts
remain operational).
196. Id. at 7-5–7-14.
197. Id. at 7-8–7-9.
198. Id. at 7-8 (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-93.1).
199. Id. (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 17.1-513.2).
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communication systems to conduct hearing. This section allows a
general district court [or circuit court] to conduct any civil proceeding,
in which a party or witness is incarcerated or when otherwise authorized
by the court, using telephonic communication or electronic audio and
video communication system to provide for the appearance of any
parties and witnesses.200
•

Va. Code § 20-88.59.201 Special rules of evidence and procedure. This
section provides that “[i]n a proceeding under this chapter, a tribunal of
the Commonwealth shall permit a party or witness residing outside the
Commonwealth to be deposed or to testify under penalty of perjury by
telephone, audiovisual means, or other electronic means at a designated
tribunal or other location. A tribunal of the Commonwealth shall
cooperate with other tribunals in designating an appropriate location
for the deposition or testimony.”202

Other states ultimately had or adopted pandemic response measures as
well, and most focused on the idea that the pandemic would be influenza.203
For example, such guides include the Judicial Council of Georgia published
the Georgia Pandemic Influenza Bench Guide,204 the North Carolina
Administrative Office of the Courts published the Pandemic Emergency Bench
Book for Trial Judges,205 and the Ohio Supreme Court published the Public
Health Preparedness Bench Book: A Guide for the Ohio Judiciary & Bar on Legal
Preparedness for Public Health Emergencies & Routine Health Cases.206 While
200. Id. (citation omitted).
201. Id. (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 20-88.59).
202. Id. (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 20-88.59).
203. JUD. COUNCIL OF GA., ADMIN. OFF. OF THE CTS. OF GA., GEORGIA PANDEMIC BENCH
GUIDE 2018 (2018) [hereinafter GEORGIA PANDEMIC BENCH GUIDE 2018], https://georgiacourts.
gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/Pandemic-Bench-Guide-Final.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8W67XGC9]; PAUL REINHARTSEN, N.C. ADMIN. OFF. OF THE CTS., PANDEMIC EMERGENCY BENCH
BOOK FOR TRIAL JUDGES (2009), https://www.sog.unc.edu/sites/www.sog.unc.edu/files/reports/
PandemicEmergencyBenchBook_Dec2009.pdf [https://perma.cc/KZM2-VHMU]; ROBERT P.
RINGLAND, PUBLIC HEALTH PREPAREDNESS BENCH BOOK: A GUIDE FOR THE OHIO JUDICIARY
& BAR ON LEGAL PREPAREDNESS FOR PUBLIC HEALTH EMERGENCIES & ROUTINE HEALTH
CASES,
http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/Boards/courtSecurity/PandemicPrepareGuide.pdf
[https://perma.cc/C26C-NNXR].
204. See GEORGIA PANDEMIC BENCH GUIDE 2018, supra note 204, at 8 (emphasizing Georgia
courts must deal with a pandemic by “protect[ing] the health and safety of everyone” at court facilities
and keeping courts open to facilitate justice for the people).
205. See REINHARTSEN, supra note 204, at 3 (providing North Carolina judges with guidance on
isolation/quarantine order during a pandemic).
206. See RINGLAND, supra note 203, at 2 (providing judicial personnel and attorneys with
guidance on dealing with a pandemic).
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some of these benchguides discussed the impact of a pandemic on court
operations, many focused on broader public health law issues concerning a
pandemic.207 For example, the 2018 version of the Georgia Pandemic
Bench Guide examined issues like “[i]nvoluntary [t]reatment for
[c]ommunicable [d]isease,” searches of property, and habeas corpus.208
However, it also discussed the continuity of operations plans for the court
system.209 Specifically, it identified the impacts of the pandemic scenario,
including a possible increase in “emergency matters and case filings
generated due to issues associated with quarantine;” that one-third of court
personnel and jurors would be unavailable due to illness or death; that
“[f]ace-to-face contact between judges, attorneys, parties, clerks and deputy
clerks, sheriffs and deputy sheriffs, court administrators and staff, state and
local public health officials, jurors, etc., necessary to perform mission
essential functions may be dramatically limited or unavailable;” and that
court facilities may be impacted by lack of staffing.210 Assuming such issues
would continue for a twelve- to eighteen-month time period, the Georgia
plan asked its courts to develop a plan for the first ninety days that would
allow the continuation of mission essential functions (to be defined in each
court’s continuity of operations plan) and to keep capacity to deal with
emergency matters brought on by quarantine and public health issues.211
IV. PLANNING IN ACTION—THE FEDERAL COURTS
AND THE 2020 COVID-19 PANDEMIC
In February 2007, two years before the H1N1 pandemic, the U.S.
Department of Health and Human Services’ Centers for Disease Control
and Prevention (CDC) issued documentary guidance on measures that
could be taken to reduce deaths during an influenza pandemic.212 This
207. GEORGIA PANDEMIC BENCH GUIDE 2018, supra note 204, at 51 (“Georgia bears primary
responsibility for preventing and responding to threats to the public’s health.”) (citations omitted);
see also REINHARTSEN, supra note 204, at 7 (enforcing public health laws via criminal prosecutions or,
alternatively, via civil actions); RINGLAND, supra note 204, at 35 (discussing the role of state
governments in enacting and enforcing public health laws).
208. GEORGIA PANDEMIC BENCH GUIDE 2018, supra note 204, at 14, 29, 41.
209. Id. at 8–9.
210. Id.
211. Id. at 9.
212. See generally Press Release, Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, HHS Unveils Two
Efforts to Advance Pandemic Flu Preparedness (Feb. 1, 2007), https://www.cdc.gov/media/pressrel/
2007/r070201a.htm [https://perma.cc/Q3RG-9N3X] (announcing measures which may reduce the
spread of infection and deaths during a pandemic).
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included a Pandemic Severity Index213 proposed to help officials adopt
nonpharmaceutical measures, like isolation and quarantine, to contain the
spread of a pandemic.214 It ranks the severity of a pandemic by the number
of fatalities it causes, ranging from a Category One pandemic (less than
90,000 deaths) to a Category Five pandemic (more than or equal to 1.8
million deaths).215 With its color-coded recommendations, it is a now
timely document encouraging isolation, quarantine, and modifying public
gatherings and work schedules to decrease the chance of overburdening the
hospital system during a pandemic and decreasing the risk of illness and
death.216
Commenting on this Pandemic Severity Index, the Task Force on
Pandemic Preparedness Planning for the Courts noted it showed the
importance of early planning for potential public health emergencies.217
The planning is particularly important in the federal courts, which are
administratively decentralized and give the authority for preparedness
planning to local judicial officials.218 There is no question the courts play
an important role in emergency situations, but there is no specific
constitutional or statutory mandate discussing the operations of federal
courts during prolonged periods of emergency.219 As such, every federal
court is ultimately responsible for the continued operation of the court
during a pandemic event while working with administrative agencies like the
Administrative Office of the Courts.220 And while it is difficult to plan in
advance for a black swan event like a pandemic, upfront planning provides
the greatest chance for court operations to continue. Florida’s advanced
planning and its experience during the H1N1 pandemic is a potent

213. See Mitigation Slides, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION,
https://www.cdc.gov/media/pdf/MitigationSlides.pdf [https://perma.cc/59B6-A3M8] (identifying
recommended community planning strategies according to potential pandemic fatality rates).
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. R. ERIC PETERSON, CONG. RSCH. SERV., RL31978: EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS AND
CONTINUITY OF OPERATIONS (COOP) PLANNING IN THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY (2005),
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/secrecy/RL31978.pdf [https://perma.cc/5JTR-Z38L].
218. Id. at 2.
219. Id. at 9 (noting the lack of constitutional or statutory authority governing the judiciary
during prolonged emergency periods).
220. Id. at 2.
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example.221
In the Executive Branch, it is the Administrative Office of the Courts, an
executive agency, that provides guidance to the federal courts regarding
disaster and emergency preparedness.222 Generally, the Administrative
Office of the Courts “provides a broad range of legislative, legal, financial,
technology, management, administrative, and program support services to
federal courts.”223 Within the Administrative Office of the Courts, the
Office of Emergency Preparedness helps courts develop crisis response
plans.224 For example, post-September 11, 2001, the Administrative Office
of the Courts supplied courts with guidelines for handling mail potentially
contaminated with anthrax and arranged for testing courthouses for
biological and chemical hazards.225
With the guidelines of the Administrative Office of the Courts, individual
components of the federal judiciary develop Continuity of Operations Plans
(COOP) in order to continue the essential operations of the entity during
an emergency situation.226 Generally, such planning involves phases that
will guide operations during specified time periods or situations and
addresses items like the safety of employees, what are considered essential
operations (and how to continue essential operations without significant
interruption), and how to return to full operations as quickly as possible.227
The federal courts’ COOP planning was put to the test in the early spring
of 2020.228 COVID-19, a novel coronavirus that had been rapidly
spreading in Asia and Europe, was first identified in the United States in

221. See generally In re Response of the Florida State Courts System to Influenza A(H1N1), supra
note 130 (instituting measures concerning pandemic preparedness in response to H1N1 influenza);
see also supra note 131 and accompanying text.
222. PETERSON, supra note 218, at 2.
223. Judicial Administration, U.S. CTS., https://www.uscourts.gov/about-federal-courts/judicialadministration [https://perma.cc/5ZBN-C9JJ].
224. PETERSON, supra note 218, at 3.
225. Id.; see The Threat of an Anthrax Attack, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION,
https://www.cdc.gov/anthrax/bioterrorism/threat.html [https://perma.cc/NL5B-SYZ8] (“Anthrax
makes a good weapon because it can be released quietly and without anyone knowing.”).
226. PETERSON, supra note 218, at 1.
227. Id. at 5.
228. Federal Courts, Crises, and the Novel Coronavirus: How America’s Courts Respond to Exigent
Circumstances, FED. BAR ASSOC. (May 21, 2020), https://www.fedbar.org/blog/federal-courts-crisesand-the-novel-coronavirus-how-americas-courts-respond-to-exigent-circumstances/ [https://perma.
cc/Q2R3-LR72].
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January 2020.229 The virus was highly contagious and spread through
person-to-person contact by respiratory droplets.230 Initially considered
particularly dangerous for the elderly and individuals with pre-existing health
conditions, especially conditions relating to the immune system, COVID19 proved dangerous to all segments of the population.231 Initial efforts at
lowering fatalities and minimizing chances of an overburdened hospital
system included social distancing, disinfecting high-touch surfaces, and
using cloth face masks when in public.232
By March 2020, the World Health Organization had classified COVID19 as a global pandemic, and the United States was in a state of
emergency.233 This prompted significant societal changes234—what was
once seen as a news story in Asia and Europe was now an American reality.
Businesses closed their doors, schools moved to online learning, and some
workers transitioned rapidly to a work-from-home model.235 States also
229. First Travel-Related Case of 2019 Novel Coronavirus Detected in United States, CTRS. FOR DISEASE
CONTROL & PREVENTION (Jan. 21, 2020), https://www.cdc.gov/media/releases/2020/p0121novel-coronavirus-travel-case.html [https://perma.cc/X2EN-V2RU].
230. How COVID-19 Spreads, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION,
https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/prevent-getting-sick/how-covid-spreads.html [https:
//perma.cc/XWE3-NQ88].
231. Denise Chow, Coronavirus Is Hard on Older People—and Scientists Aren’t Sure Why, NBC NEWS
(Mar. 10, 2020, 4:00 AM), https://www.nbcnews.com/science/science-news/coronavirus-hard-olderpeople-scientists-aren-t-sure-why-n1153701 [https://perma.cc/3972-HTB2].
232. See Considerations for Wearing Masks, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION,
https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/prevent-getting-sick/cloth-face-cover-guidance.html
[https://perma.cc/PKX6-HU8H] (suggesting the use of masks when you are unable to maintain social
distance); see also Cleaning and Disinfecting Your Facility, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION,
https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/community/disinfecting-building-facility.html [https:
//perma.cc/ARN5-2KNL] (“Generally, the more people who touch a surface, the higher the risk.
Prioritize cleaning high-touch surfaces at least once a day.”).
233. Proclamation No. 9994, 85 Fed. Reg. 15,337 (Mar. 13, 2020), available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2020-03-18/pdf/2020-05794.pdf [https://perma.cc/5N
VR-G2UD].
234. See, e.g., Considerations for Wearing Masks, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION,
https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/prevent-getting-sick/cloth-face-cover-guidance.html
[https://perma.cc/PKX6-HU8H] (providing guidance to individuals concerning effectively wearing
masks).
235. Anne Sraders & Lance Lambert, Nearly 100,000 Establishments that Temporarily Shut Down
Due to the Pandemic Are Now Out of Business, FORTUNE (Sept. 28, 2020, 9:25 AM),
https://fortune.com/2020/09/28/covid-buisnesses-shut-down-closed/ [https://perma.cc/D5HBDQ6N]; Vicky Valet, Working from Home During the Coronavirus Pandemic: What You Need to Know, FORBES
(Mar. 12, 2020, 4:30 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/vickyvalet/2020/03/12/workingfrom-home-during-the-coronavirus-pandemic-what-you-need-to-know/?sh=2efc66a71421 [https://
perma.cc/33LG-GXSZ]; Lara Fishbane & Adie Tomer, As Classes Move Online During COVID-19, What
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began to limit the number of people that could be present during any inperson gathering.236
These changes were based on sound epidemiological principles.237 The
COVID-19 virus is spread primarily through respiratory particles inhaled by
others in the vicinity of an infected person.238 As such, one of the best
ways to contain the spread of the virus is to reduce in-person contact and
ensure that as few people as possible are exposed to the “cloud” of particles
that emanate from human noses and mouths during normal interactions.239
Americans are now familiar with the phrase “social distancing,” which
captures the idea that limiting in-person contact and staying six feet apart
from other people in public places, is an effective way to decrease potential
exposure to respiratory droplets containing the virus.240 This is particularly
important when a virus, like COVID-19, turns some people into
asymptomatic carriers that can spread the virus to others, even though the
spreader does not feel sick.241
Beginning in early March, federal district and circuit courts began to
activate their COOP plans.242 A good example comes from the Central

Are Disconnected Students to Do?, BROOKINGS (Mar. 20, 2020), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/
the-avenue/2020/03/20/as-classes-move-online-during-covid-19-what-are-disconnected-studentsto-do/ [https://perma.cc/QAH6-J6EK].
236. Dena Bunis & Jenny Rough, List of Coronavirus-Related Restrictions in Every State, AARP,
https://www.aarp.org/politics-society/government-elections/info-2020/coronavirus-state-restrictio
ns.html [https://perma.cc/4NX4-B4E7].
237. Principles of Epidemiology in Public Health Practice, Third Edition an Introduction to Applied
Epidemiology and Biostatics, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/
csels/dsepd/ss1978/lesson1/section1.html [https://perma.cc/SVF4-S35M].
238. Transmission of SARS-CoV-2: Implications for Infection Prevention Precautions, WORLD HEALTH
ORG. (July 9, 2020), https://www.who.int/news-room/commentaries/detail/transmission-of-sarscov-2-implications-for-infection-prevention-precautions [https://perma.cc/2WH3-8XF3].
239. Social Distancing, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/
coronavirus/2019-ncov/prevent-getting-sick/social-distancing.html [https://perma.cc/4KDT-HT
5R].
240. Id.
241. Pien Huang, What We Know About the Silent Spreaders of COVID-19, NPR (Apr. 13, 2020,
4:43 PM), https://www.npr.org/sections/goatsandsoda/2020/04/13/831883560/can-a-coronaviruspatient-who-isnt-showing-symptoms-infect-others [https://perma.cc/W58G-HSY6].
242. See Court Operations During COVID-19: 50-State Resources, JUSTIA, https://www.justia.
com/covid-19/50-state-covid-19-resources/court-operations-during-covid-19-50-state-resources/
[https://perma.cc/RRM4-2HG7] (summarizing how state court systems “altered their operations in
response to the coronavirus pandemic”).
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District of California, in an order dated March 19, 2020.243 The Order
notes that the state of California was under a declaration of emergency, that
in-person gatherings should not exceed ten people, and that COVID-19
infections in the district were expected to rise.244 As such, the district
closed the courthouses for public hearings, limited emergency civil matters
to telephonic hearing only, and provided judges with discretion to employ
telephonic hearings in criminal matters (with in-person matters directed to
a single location within the district).245 Judicial chambers’ staff were also
directed to telework.246
The approach employed by the Central District of California is among
the most common of early responses to COVID-19 in the federal courts.247
It provides a mix of virtual and in-person options, with a key element being
judicial discretion.248 Under the Order, even criminal actions are given a
telephonic hearing option based on the discretion of the underlying
judge.249
Other courts revealed a more immediate adoption of remote
proceedings.250 On March 13, 2020, the Northern District of Alabama
issued an order referencing the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic
Security Act (CARES Act), which authorized the use of video and
telephone conferencing for criminal matters on motion of the
court.251 The district also noted the rapid spread of COVID-19 cases in
Alabama and authorized the use of video teleconferencing or audio
teleconferencing in several criminal case events, with the consent of the

243. In re Coronavirus Public Emergency Activation of Continuity of Operations Plan,
No. 20-042, 1 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 19, 2020), https://www.cacd.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files
/documents/Order_20-042.pdf [https://perma.cc/3LBY-JCWF].
244. Id. at 1–2.
245. Id. at 2–3.
246. Id. at 3.
247. See id. at 2 (activating district’s continuity of operations plan to maintain performance of
essential functions).
248. Id. at 2–3.
249. Id. at 3.
250. See, e.g., In re The National Emergency Declared on March 13, 2020, No. 2020-03
Authorizing Use of Video and Audio to Conduct Criminal Proceedings (N.D. Ala. Mar. 30, 2020),
https://www.alnd.uscourts.gov/sites/alnd/files/General%20Order%202020-03%20-%20Authorizin
g%20Use%20of%20Video%20and%20Audio%20to%20Conduct%20Criminal%20Proceedings%20e
ffective%20March%2030%2C%202020.pdf [https://perma.cc/EM5Q-2Y7K] (authorizing remoteteleconferencing for criminal cases under the CARES Act).
251. Id.
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Defendant.252 The Northern District of Florida also issued an order
showing a preference for remote appearance—the district issued equipment
to all staff to allow them to telework, and “[i]n-person hearings, when
possible, [were] converted to telephonic or video conference hearings.”253
The chart below shows the wide disparity in responses to the early spread
of the COVID-19 pandemic in the federal district and circuit courts, with a
focus on individual courts’ decisions to adopt videoconferencing or
teleconferencing to continue with their docket254:

MARCH AND APRIL 2020—
FEDERAL DISTRICT AND CIRCUIT COURTS MOVE
TO TELECONFERENCING AND VIDEO
50
45
40
35
30
25
20
15
10
5
0
Category 1

Category 2

Category 3

Category 4

Category 5

252. Id.
253. In re Court Operations Under the Exigent Circumstances Created by COVID-19,
No. 4:95mc40111, 1–2 (N. D. Fla. Mar. 23, 2020), http://www.flnd.uscourts.gov/sites/default/
files/general-ordes/20200323_AdminOrder_COVID19_Summary_Fina.pdf%5B87%5D.pdf [https:
//perma.cc/B2ZV-K76Q].
254. Court Orders and Updates During COVID-19 Pandemic, U.S. CTS., https://www.
uscourts.gov/about-federal-courts/court-website-links/court-orders-and-updates-during-covid19-pa
ndemic [https://perma.cc/XV42-B47U].
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Category 1:

Category 2:

Category 3:

Category 4:

Category 5:

Immediate
teleconferencing/
videoconferencing response or
no continuances

Postponed or
had in-person
hearings then
proceeded to
teleconferencing
in less than a
month

Postponed or
had in-person
hearings for
over a month
then proceeded
to teleconferencing

Postponed or
continued all
hearings and
did not use
teleconferencing/videoconferencing

Postponed or
continued unless the
judge or parties
requested
teleconferencing or
videoconferencing

1. First Circuit
2. Second
Circuit
3. Fifth Circuit
4. Seventh
Circuit
5. Eleventh
Circuit
6. Federal
Circuit
7. Alabama
Northern
8. Alabama
Southern
9. District of
Columbia
10. Florida
Northern
11. Georgia
Middle
12. Georgia
Southern
13. Illinois
Central
14. Illinois
Northern
15. Kentucky
Eastern
16. Kentucky
Western
17. Michigan
Western
18. Mississippi
Northern
19. Missouri
Eastern
20. Nebraska
21. New
Hampshire
22. New York
Northern
23. New York
Southern

1. Tenth Circuit
2. Alabama
Middle
3. Arkansas
Eastern
4. Colorado
5. Hawaii
6. Idaho
7. Louisiana
Eastern
8. Louisiana
Middle
9. Maine
10. Michigan
Eastern
11. Pennsylvania
Middle
12. Puerto Rico
13. Tennessee
Western
14. Wisconsin
Eastern
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1. Sixth
Circuit
2. Eighth
Circuit
3. Alaska
4. California
Northern
5. Hawaii
6. Indiana
Northern
7. Missouri
Western
8. Oklahoma
Northern
9. Oregon
10. Vermont
11. West
Virginia
Southern

1.
2.
3.
4.

Kansas
Maryland
Nevada
Oklahoma
Eastern
5. Oklahoma
Western
6. Wisconsin
Western

1.
2.
3.
4.

Third Circuit
Fourth Circuit
Ninth Circuit
District of
Columbia Circuit
5. Arizona
6. Arkansas
Western
7. California
Central
8. California
Eastern
9. California
Southern
10. Connecticut
11. Delaware
12. Florida Middle
13. Florida Southern
14. Georgia
Northern
15. Guam
16. Illinois Southern
17. Indiana Southern
18. Iowa Northern
19. Iowa Southern
20. Louisiana
Western
21. Massachusetts
22. Minnesota
23. Mississippi
Southern
24. Montana
25. New Jersey
26. New Mexico
27. New York
Eastern
28. New York
Western
29. North Carolina
Eastern
30. North Carolina
Eastern
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24. North
Carolina
Western
25. Northern
Mariana
Islands
26. Ohio
Northern
27. Rhode Island
28. Tennessee
Eastern
29. Utah
30. Virginia
Western
31. West Virginia
Northern
32. Wisconsin
Eastern
33. Wyoming

[Vol. 53:157
31. North Carolina
Middle
32. Ohio Southern
33. Oregon
34. Pennsylvania
Eastern
35. Pennsylvania
Western
36. South Carolina
37. South Dakota
38. Tennessee
Middle
39. Texas Eastern
40. Texas Northern
41. Texas Southern
42. Texas Western
43. Virgin Islands
44. Virginia Eastern
45. Washington
Eastern
46. Washington
Western

As the chart above illustrates, there was a disparate response to the early
stages of the pandemic. Indeed, even within individual circuit courts’
geographic areas, individual district courts took various approaches.
In some ways, this flexibility is a good thing—although the COVID-19
pandemic is and was a national event, its early impact was vastly different
by geographic region.255 At the time of initial responses, cases of the virus
were higher in the American Northeast, thus necessitating different
measures for that area.256 However, the disparate approaches did create
confusion.257 Local bar associations, private firm websites, and legal

255. See Stephanie Bialek et al., Geographic Differences in COVID-19 Cases, Deaths, and Incidence—
United States, February 12–April 7, 2020, 69 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 465, 464–66 (2020)
(“Cumulative COVID-19 incidence varied substantially by jurisdiction, ranging from 20.6 cases per
100,000 in Minnesota to 915.3 in NYC.”).
256. See Sarah Mervosh & Julie Bosman, The Northeast Held the Virus in Check. Now Cases Are
Inching Up Again., N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 9, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/10/09/us/northeastcoronavirus-cases.html [https://perma.cc/TP7W-Q3FH] (discussing the devastation experienced by
the Northeast due to COVID-19 in Spring 2020).
257. See, e.g., Elise Schmelzer, Uneven Response to Coronavirus in Colorado Courts Leads to Confusion,
Differing Outcomes for Defendants (Mar. 21, 2020), https://www.denverpost.com/2020/03/21/coloradocourts-coronavirus-judges/ [https://perma.cc/4M3Z-7YPC] (stating varying approaches to
conducting criminal hearings during the pandemic has led to confusion and unpredictability).
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research providers became critical for providing up-to-date information
about court operations and requirements.258
Additionally, whether or not jury trials were allowed varied significantly
by court.259 For example, the Western District of Texas continued with
jury trials and grand jury proceedings until November 2020, when it
determined that it was unsafe to continue to do so based on positivity rates
and hospitalization rates.260 The District of Maryland showed the same
kind of behavior—although it was re-starting jury trials in August 2020—by
November 2020, all in-person proceedings were suspended.261
Other federal courts located in cold-weather states made the same move,
noting concerns about increased infection rates in the winter season.262 For
example, the Western District of Pennsylvania, the District of Colorado, and
the Northern District of New York decided to suspend jury trials in order
to protect the health and safety of court staff and litigants.263 Judges also
noted reluctance on the part of potential jurors to participate in in-person
proceedings, thus impacting the ability of courts to gather a sufficient crosssection of the population when seating a jury.264
Following the March 2020 early responses by federal courts, the
Administrative Office of the Courts issued a gating strategy in April 2020 to
help provide courts with benchmarks on how to reopen or lift
restrictions.265 The main analysis under the gating strategy was to use local
data to determine what types of in-person functions were appropriate in a
given geographic area.266 Like its previous COOP strategies, the gating

258. See, e.g., COVID19 Response Resources, SAN ANTONIO BAR ASS’N, available at
https://sanantoniobar.org/?pg=COVIDRESOURCE [https://perma.cc/LF97-ALYX] (providing
updates and notices regarding federal, state, and local courts in the San Antonio metro area).
259. See generally Court Operations During COVID-19: 50-State Resources, supra note 243
(summarizing varied approaches to jury trials during COVID-19 pandemic).
260. Angela Morris, Amid COVID-19 Spike, 25 Federal Courts in 21 States Are Quitting Jury Trials
Again, LAW (Nov. 20, 2020, 2:22 PM), https://www.law.com/texaslawyer/2020/11/20/amid-covid19-spike-25-federal-courts-in-21-states-are-quitting-jury-trials-again/?slreturn=20210219154204
[https://perma.cc/C5YZ-3ECX].
261. Courts Suspending Jury Trials As COVID-19 Cases Surge, U.S. CTS. (Nov. 20, 2020),
https://www.uscourts.gov/news/2020/11/20/courts-suspending-jury-trials-covid-19-cases-surge?
utm_campaign=usc-news&utm_medium=email&utm_source=govdelivery [https://perma.cc/SW
K2-UYTS].
262. Id.
263. Id.
264. Id.
265. Id.
266. Id.
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strategy was heavily reliant on local control and decision-making.267
Central was employee safety, with the AOC noting:
The health and welfare of each Judiciary employee, contractor, and member
of the public that enters our facilities should be paramount in the decisions
that are made as these guidelines are implemented. Because each state and
municipality is in a different posture in the fight against COVID-19, each
circuit and district will have to make local decisions on operational status
based on the jurisdiction’s current COVID-19 case count and local stay-athome and quarantine orders.268

The actual gating plan is divided into four phases, with the phase level
determined by a locality’s “total population[,] population density[,]
population over 60[,] availability of ICU beds[,]” stress on the hospital
system, and confirmed cases of COVID-19.269 Gating criteria include what
exposure has occurred at the court facilities, whether there is a “[s]ustained
downward trend of cumulative daily COVID-19 case counts over a 14-day
period,” and if local and state authorities have restricted movement or issued
shelter-in-place orders.270 Courts were also directed to consider their phase
selection in conjunction with the phase being announced by local public
health and safety agencies.271 The critical steps of each phase are laid out
by sub-sections impacting employees, the judges/court, human resources,
and facilities.272 For example, regarding court operations, Phase One (the
most restrictive phase) states that in-person court proceedings should:
[C]ontinue to be minimized (critical cases only) using video- and teleconferencing to the greatest extent possible. Those who must conduct faceto-face meetings should limit gatherings to no more than 10-people, adhere
to strict social 6-foot distancing and hygiene protocols (to include wearing of

267. Courts Begin to Consider Guidelines for Reopening, U.S. CTS. (Apr. 27, 2020),
https://www.uscourts.gov/news/2020/04/27/courts-begin-consider-guidelines-reopening [https://
perma.cc/2ZD2-8FPT].
268. Federal Judiciary COVID-19 Recovery Guidelines, U.S. CTS. 2 (May 7, 2020),
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/GAO/federal-judiciary-covid-19-rec
overy-guidelines.pdf [https://perma.cc/D8MU-2243].
269. Id. at 5.
270. Id. at 3.
271. Id. at 3, 5.
272. Id. at 9–13.
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face coverings or masks), and make every attempt to “prescreen” supervisees
and clients to ensure they are asymptomatic for COVID-19.273

Phase Four, the least restrictive phase of the plan, is to be used after a
public health announcement stating that “COVID-19 has been suppressed
within the United States.”274 At that point, there would be unrestricted
staffing of the federal courthouses, and “full, unrestricted operations and
activities.”275
V. NEXT STEPS AND LESSONS LEARNED
In analyzing the early stage of pandemic responsiveness in the federal
courts, a few items stand out as lessons for the future: the impact on court
caseloads, the preference for in-person proceedings, the use of new
technology, and the importance of clear, preemptive planning. There is
certainly no question that COVID-19 will breed a new generation of COOP
plans, state judicial bench guides, and guidance from the Administrative
Office of the Courts. History continues to show that court planning
becomes stronger and more effective after each pandemic touchpoint. For
example, H1N1 ushered in a huge wave of operations planning and
pandemic responsiveness in the state and federal courts.276 There is no
doubt that COVID-19 will and should do the same.
In March 2021, the Administrative Office of the Courts published the
annual Report of the Director to discuss the business of the judiciary in 2020.277
Unsurprisingly, COVID-19 featured heavily in the report, as did a
discussion of court operations considering the pandemic.278
The report showed an interesting statistic—case filings in the federal
district courts were up by 39%.279 The largest increase is from civil filings,
which were up 58% in 2020.280 However, some of that increase can be
attributed to a single item of multidistrict litigation in one district court,

273. Id. at 10.
274. Id. at 25.
275. Id. at 26.
276. See supra Part II.
277. Judiciary Releases Annual Report and Judicial Business 2020, U.S. CTS. (Mar. 16, 2021),
https://www.uscourts.gov/news/2021/03/16/judiciary-releases-annual-report-and-judicial-business2020 [https://perma.cc/7XTP-NFX3].
278. Id.
279. Id.
280. Id.
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without which total civil filings would have otherwise decreased by 10%.281
This suggests that court activity was actually relatively flat or decreased in
2020, with criminal filings dropping 20%, bankruptcy proceedings falling
21%, and filings in the court of appeals declining less than 1%.282 Against
this background, public perception that the wheels of justice slowed during
the pandemic is not inaccurate.283 Future years may show an increased
appetite for justice as lessening pandemic restrictions and a return to relative
normalcy cause some to pick up on business that lay fallow during 2020.
Looking back on the early federal court responses to COVID-19, perhaps
most intriguing is how quickly the pandemic required courts to move to new
technologies.284 The Supreme Court of the United States is a particularly
bad offender in adopting new technology—it did not even accept online
filings until 2018 (when other courts had been doing so for decades).285
The COVID-19 pandemic forced the court to hear remote arguments by
telephone for the first time, with live audio streaming available to the outside
world.286 This may indicate less reluctance for the Court moving forward
to adopt audio or video streaming to increase access to its proceedings.
Similarly, other courts embraced technology never before considered to
conduct court business and retain public access to justice.
In
September 2020, 86 out of 94 district courts and all the federal circuit courts
of appeal were conducting some hearings through remote technology—a
far cry from initial local orders, which showed very disparate views of the
use of remote proceedings.287
281. Judicial Business 2020, U.S. CTS., https://www.uscourts.gov/statistics-reports/judicialbusiness-2020 [https://perma.cc/A8R2-URCR].
282. Id.
283. See, e.g., Melissa Chan, ‘I Want This Over.’ For Victims and the Accused, Justice Is Delayed As
COVID-19 Snarls Courts, TIME (Feb. 22, 2021), https://time.com/5939482/covid-19-criminal-casesbacklog/ [https://perma.cc/37V8-XVDM] (highlighting cancellations or scaled back proceedings due
to the spread of the virus).
284. See, e.g., James Mayse, Video Hearings Could Become Permanent After Pandemic Is Over,
MESSENGER-INQUIRER (May 6, 2020), https://www.messenger-inquirer.com/community/videohearings-could-become-permanent-after-pandemic-is-over/article_7bdbc9f4-c0fd-5cb5-9871-6ba366
408022.html [https://perma.cc/9TSQ-4BRU] (welcoming the push to use technology because it has
previously been contemplated).
285. Mark Sherman & Jessica Gresko, You’ve Reached the Supreme Court. Press 1 for Live Arguments,
AP NEWS (Apr. 22, 2020), https://apnews.com/article/19b82f029dcb760dc7f0c644472192fb
[https://perma.cc/Q58E-YRPZ].
286. Id.
287. Janna Adelstein, Courts Continue to Adapt to COVID-19, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST.
(Sept. 10, 2020), https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/analysis-opinion/courts-continue-adaptcovid-19 [https://perma.cc/QD6Q-3X7Z].
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Although video and audio proceedings seem to be working (at least in
some ways), there is no question that there is still a strong preference for inperson hearings.288 In September 2020, almost one-third of the federal
district courts had entered orders for in-person jury trials to resume.289
These orders came with a host of safety requirements, such as social
distancing, deep cleaning courtrooms, and the use of plexiglass shields.290
As noted above, many of these orders were subsequently pulled back in
November 2020 to accommodate increasing COVID-19 and
hospitalization rates, as well as fears concerning a spike in cases during the
cold-weather months.
The preference for in-person hearings makes sense, especially set against
a background of research showing that remote appearances can change the
outcome or course of proceedings. For example, the National Center for
State Courts released a study in 2010 that found 37% of state courts that
were using remote appearance technology did not have a way for a client to
communicate privately with their attorney during the course of
proceedings.291 Another study conducted in Cook County, Illinois,
determined that judges tended to impose higher bail amounts when a
defendant appeared by video rather than in person.292 The study authors
posited this could be from a lack of direct eye contact and difficulty in the
client communicating with their attorney during the proceeding.293 This
type of negative assessment is contrasted against calls for the increased use
of remote proceedings even beyond the pandemic because it allows lowincome litigants a less burdensome way to access the courtroom.294
Further, certainly during the pandemic, remote proceedings allowed at least

288. Id. (acknowledging a preference for in-person proceedings but noting remote proceedings
have garnered support).
289. Id.
290. Id.
291. Alicia L. Bannon & Douglas Keith, Remote Court: Principles for Virtual Proceedings During the
COVID-19 Pandemic and Beyond, 115 NW. U. L. REV. 1875, 1893 n.96 (2021) (citing Eric T. Bellone,
Private Attorney-Client Communications and the Effect of Videoconferencing in the Courtroom, 8 J. INT’L COM. L.
& TECH. 24, 44–45 (2013)).
292. Alicia Bannon & Janna Adelstein, The Impact of Video Proceedings on Fairness and Access to Justice
in Court, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (Sept. 10, 2020), https://www.brennancenter.org/ourwork/research-reports/impact-video-proceedings-fairness-and-access-justice-court [https://perma.cc
/MN5R-YBLX].
293. Id.
294. Id.
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some cases to continue instead of stalling all courthouse business for the
year.295
In 2016, the National Association of Presiding Judges and Court
Executive Officers released a Study of State Trial Courts Use of Remote
Technology.296 The report noted, “State trial courts for decades now have
embraced and expanded the use of a variety of technology innovations
designed to improve court operations[,] . . . including the use of video
conferencing.”297 The report also noted the legal basis for this use—while
remote proceedings had been used in state courts, they were also subject to
For example, the right of
certain constitutional constraints.298
confrontation, due process, and right to be present were all active
considerations in any given case for remote hearings, and video
conferencing is considered permissible for initial non-adversarial criminal
proceedings.299 Outside the criminal context, states showed even more
widespread adoption of remote appearance technologies.300
With this type of history, it seems that the use of video conferencing
technologies in civil cases and non-adversarial criminal proceedings could
remain in place even after the COVID-19 pandemic ends. While there was
larger interest in remote proceedings before the pandemic, the closing of
courthouses has now forced judges and court staff to acclimate to this new
way of doing business.301 Remote proceedings allow for increased
efficiency, reduced travel time, decreased need for inmate transports, and
cost savings.302
However, even if remote proceedings do not become the new normal in
a world after COVID-19, there is no question that they will become an
295. Chan, supra note 284 (noting “[s]ince COVID-19 was declared a national emergency in
March 2020, every state and Washington, D.C., has canceled or scaled back in-person criminal court
proceedings to stem the spread of the virus. The snarled justice system has left hundreds of thousands
of families waiting for trials and other resolutions . . . ”).
296. Mike L. Bridenback, Study of State Trial Courts Use of Remote Technology, STATE JUST.
INST., at i (Apr. 2016), https://napco4courtleaders.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/EmergingCourt-Technologies-9-27-Bridenback.pdf [https://perma.cc/CU54-HE3U].
297. Id. at 1.
298. Id. at 2.
299. Id. at 3–6.
300. Id. at 6.
301. Angela Morris, Judges Rush to Learn Video Conferencing As Shelter-In-Place Orders Spread Across
Texas Metros, LAW (Mar. 24, 2020), https://www.law.com/texaslawyer/2020/03/24/judges-rush-tolearn-video-conferencing-as-shelter-in-place-orders-spread-across-texas-metros/ [https://perma.cc/
MYC5-E8NU].
302. Mayse, supra note 285.

https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thestmaryslawjournal/vol53/iss1/4

44

Niesel: The AOC in the Age of COVID

2021]

THE AOC IN THE AGE OF COVID

201

important part of pandemic preparedness planning. Before mass facility
closures in March 2020, the federal judiciary and the AOC established a task
force to assess the impact of the virus and help coordinate response
efforts.303 This body produced guidance on pandemic-related issues,
including “bankruptcy administration, budgets, court interpreting, court
reporting, facilities and security, finance and internal control, financial
disclosure, human resources and benefits, information technology, jury
duty, naturalization ceremonies, probation and pretrial services,
procurement, and telework.”304 The AOC ultimately produced the gating
strategy discussed above, which provided guidelines for courts on
reopening.305
While these are laudable steps during a shocking year, they also highlight
the importance of preemptive emergency planning. Before H1N1 ever
materialized, some courts did significant preemptive planning for a flu
outbreak.306 It is unsurprising that these courts, such as those within the
Florida state court system, then faced few delays or hiccups in administering
justice.307 Post-H1N1 saw a significant rise in preemptive pandemic
planning, especially regarding facilities and possible legal issues (such as the
relationship between due process and habeas corpus with quarantine).308
These pre-COVID plans had a number of things in common: discussion of
quarantine and isolation legal issues, the emergency powers provided to
various government branches in a pandemic situation, how to handle
criminal matters (such as arrests, warrants, and investigatory stops), and how
to continue with court functions.309 Sections on court functions centered
around how to triage essential legal issues (such as preferencing habeas
matters over civil trials) and how to communicate effectively with court

303. Court Operations and Pandemic Response—Annual Report 2020, U.S. CTS., https://www.
uscourts.gov/statistics-reports/court-operations-and-pandemic-response-annual-report-2020 [https:
//perma.cc/QM49-B2LY].
304. Id.
305. Id.
306. See, e.g., FLA. CT. EDUC. COUNCIL’S PUBL’NS COMM., supra note 46, at vi–viii (“In 2006, in
anticipation of such a prospect [of an influenza pandemic], the CEMG presented the Supreme Court
with a report entitled Florida State Courts Strategy for Pandemic Influenza: Keeping the Courts Open in a
Pandemic.”).
307. See In re Response of the Florida State Courts System to Influenza A(H1N1), supra note 130
(acknowledging Florida’s extensive pandemic preparedness planning and ordering continued
adherence to and development of such planning).
308. FLA. CT. EDUC. COUNCIL’S PUBL’NS COMM., supra note 46, at 18, 29.
309. Id. at 57–61, 84.
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staff. While some pre-COVID documents did delve into the possibility of
telework or remote hearings, this was a less common approach.310
Now in looking back, with the benefit of additional guidance over the
course of the last year, it seems there are a few items that must be included
in pandemic planning in the future. These additions come from the
unfurling guidance that developed from March 2020-November 2020,
showing various aspects that were missing or of less attention in previous
planning documents.
First, pandemic preparedness plans should identify appropriate
underlying data sets for determining court closures and re-openings. The
AOC used this approach in its gating strategy for reopening—courts would
consider the locality’s “total population[,] population density[,] population
over 60[,] availability of ICU beds[,]” stress on the hospital system, and
confirmed cases of COVID-19 in deciding the level of court operations that
would be appropriate for a given area.311 This pulls from other documents
that are used to assess pandemic severity; for example, the CDC’s 2007
Pandemic Severity Index312 uses a color-coded index based on underlying
data points to identify containment measures for a pandemic situation. A
similar color-coded system in place for federal court planning purposes
could help districts and circuits act more consistently in deciding how to
handle pandemic conditions.
Next, now that the COVID-19 technological push has occurred,
pandemic preparation plans should consider how to create consistent
technological approaches. Early data from March 2020 shows that the
federal courts were vastly different in how they responded to courthouse
closures and the need for social distancing.313 More concrete planning
surrounding what hearings and procedures can be conducted remotely, what
technology will be used, and how that technology will be accessed will keep
early responses more consistent and easier for the public and legal
profession to navigate. Further, it will also let attorneys advise clients who
may be uncertain about their physical safety.
Finally, additional consistency in a geographic region, to the extent it is
consistent with underlying pandemic data, would also increase transparency
and help lawyers and litigants navigate various courthouse orders. During
310.
311.
312.
313.

Id. at vii.
Federal Judiciary COVID-19 Recovery Guidelines, supra note 269, at 5.
Mitigation Slides, supra note 214.
See supra Chart 1–2.
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the COVID-19 pandemic, court orders were often disparate (as seen in the
chart above) and could vary even within the same geographic region. For
example, North Carolina’s three judicial districts split in approach in the
earliest parts of the pandemic.314 So too did the federal districts in
Wisconsin and Illinois.315 While some of these discrepancies could be due
to the difference between population centers, increased consistency would
make it more efficient and consistent for attorneys and the public.
Ultimately, the federal courts have a long history of resilience in the face
of emergency situations. Even during previous pandemics, there has always
been a strong commitment to keeping the courthouse doors open to the
public. COVID-19 has not changed that spirit—it has only highlighted new
ways of doing business. In 2021 and beyond, as new pandemic
preparedness measures are considered, valuing consistency and
communication should allow future emergency events to be handled in an
even smoother and more transparent manner.

314. Id.
315. Id.
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